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A B S T R A C T
This paper analyzes the provision of public goods with cross border externalities by representa
tive democracies. The level of provision of each country is decided by a policy maker elected by
majority rule at the country level. We compare the case in which policy makers set their policies
noncooperatively with the case in which they set their policies through Coasian cooperation.
Cooperation induces policy makers to internalize cross border externalities, but it also induces
strategic voters to elect a policy maker who cares less about the public good to reduce their public
good contribution. The former eﬀect increases public good provision while the latter reduces it.
We show that once voters' incentives are taken into account, whether cooperation is beneﬁcial
depends neither on voters' preferences, nor on the magnitude of spillovers, nor on the size,
bargaining power, or eﬃciency of each country. Instead, it depends only on the curvature of the
demand for the public good: cooperation increases (decreases) public good provision when the
demand function is more (less) convex than the unit elastic demand function. Hence, the
desirability of international cooperation depends mostly on the type of public good considered.
1. Introduction
Cross border externalities and transnational public goods lead to ineﬃciencies and collective action failure when countries set
their policies noncooperatively. In the absence of overarching political institutions, observers often call for greater coordination
between national policy makers to internalize these externalities. However, despite the multiplication of international negotiations
and summits, the supposed gains from international cooperation have arguably not fully materialized. Many global public goods
such as the reduction of greenhouse gas emission, political asylum, disease eradication, ﬁsh stocks, or ﬁscal stimulus are still
underprovided.
Since Coase (1960), economists have invoked transaction costs of various sorts to explain the inability of bargaining parties to
reach mutually beneﬁcial arrangements.1 This strand of literature focuses on the bargaining process and does not take into account
the speciﬁcities of the political process within each country. Others have argued that international policy coordination can exacerbate
ineﬃciencies in national politics.2 This paper assumes away any ineﬃciencies in national politics or in Coasian cooperation, and
focuses instead on the interaction between elections at the national level and cooperation at the international level.
In modern democracies, most decision are taken not by the voters, but by political representatives appointed by the voters. As
Persson and Tabellini (1992) ﬁrst pointed out, even if one abstracts away from political agency issues, this distinction has important
E-mail address: aloeper@eco.uc3m.es.
1 Among others, commitment and enforcement problems (Williamson, 1985; North, 1990; Acemoglu, 2003) or imperfect information (Mailath and Postlewaite,
1990; Harstad, 2007) can lead to ineﬃciencies.
2 International policy coordination can exacerbate political agency problems (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980; Buchanan and Faith, 1987; Tabellini, 1990; Persson
and Tabellini, 1995) or dynamic commitment problems between voters and politicians (Rogoﬀ, 1985; Kehoe, 1989).
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consequences, because sophisticated voters can use elections as a strategic delegation mechanism. Several papers have shown that
once voters' incentives are taken into account, the impact of international cooperation on public good provision is ambiguous
(Segendorﬀ, 1998; Gradstein, 2004; Buchholz et al., 2005; Kempf and Rossignol, 2013). On the one hand, cooperation helps national
policy makers internalize cross border spillovers. This direct eﬀect increases public good provision. On the other hand, more public
good requires greater contributions from participating countries. As a result, cooperation induces strategic voters to elect
representatives who care less about the public good, so as to decrease their relative contribution. This electoral eﬀect decreases
public good provision. In this paper, we determine the main drivers of the magnitude of this electoral eﬀect, and characterize the
conditions under which it only mitigates, or completely oﬀsets the direct eﬀect of cooperation.
We consider a model with two countries populated by a continuum of heterogeneous voters. Each country must decide the level
of provision of a public good with cross border externalities. The preferences of a given voter are characterized by a type that
determines her trade oﬀ between public good and private good consumption. This type can be interpreted as her tax price for the
public good, and the mapping between her tax price and her most preferred level of public good is the public good demand function.
Countries' policies are determined in a two stage game. In the ﬁrst stage the electoral stage each country elects a representative
among its residents by majority rule. In the second stage the policy making stage the elected representatives choose, cooperatively
or noncooperatively, the level of provision of their respective public good. In the cooperative regime, the representatives implement
the generalized Nash bargaining solution with the noncooperative outcome as the bargaining default.
The main result is that whether cooperation increases the equilibrium level of public good relative to the noncooperative regime
depends neither on the distribution of voters' preferences, nor on the magnitude of cross border spillovers, nor on the relative size,
eﬃciency, or bargaining power of each country. Instead, it depends only on the curvature of the demand for the public good. In the
basic model, cooperation increases (decreases) public good provision if the public good demand function is more (less) convex than
the unit elastic demand. This result holds unchanged for a large class of bargaining solutions. Making the two public goods closer
substitutes makes cooperation more likely to be beneﬁcial, but does not change the qualitative nature of the result. The model further
shows that once voters' incentives are taken into account, allowing for transfers across countries can make cooperation detrimental.
That the desirability of cooperation is independent of the magnitude of spillovers may appear surprising, because the magnitude
of the spillovers determines the ineﬃciency of the noncooperative equilibrium, and thus the potential gains from cooperation. The
intuition for that result is as follows. Relative to the noncooperative equilibrium, cooperation requires the policy maker of, say,
country 1 to provide more public good, and thus its voters to pay higher taxes. This impact of cooperation on the voters of country 1
is due to the internalization of the externality they impose on country 2. Therefore, as the magnitude of this externality increases, the
cost of cooperation on the voters of country 1 increases. In the electoral stage, these voters react to the greater cost of cooperation by
appointing a representative with a higher tax price for the public good, thereby oﬀsetting the eﬀect of greater spillovers in the policy
making stage of the cooperative regime.
The intuition behind the role of the convexity of the public good demand function is more subtle and stems from the distributive
eﬀect of Coasian cooperation. As ﬁrst intuited by Schelling (1960), since Coasian cooperation tends to equalize the gains from
cooperation, it generates incentives to strategically delegate the negotiations to an agent who has less to gain from cooperation.
Whether these incentives induce voters to elect a higher or a lower tax price representative turns out to depend solely on the
curvature of the demand function. The reason for this is as follows. Cooperation basically prescribes the representative of each
country to behave as if his tax price for the public good is subsidized at a rate that corrects for the externality, even though the
subsidy is not actually paid. Thus, the cost of cooperation for each representative is the deadweight loss of a proportional subsidy.
Simple calculus shows that the deadweight loss of a proportional subsidy, as given by the well known Harberger formula, increases
(decreases) in the pre subsidy price when the demand function is less (more) convex than a unit elastic demand. So when the public
good demand is, say, less convex than a unit elastic demand, as the tax price of the representative increases, his private cost of
internalizing the externality its country imposes increases. Coasian cooperation compensates him for this greater cost by tilting the
bargaining outcome in his favor and requiring a greater contribution from the other country, relative to the case of a unit elastic
demand function. This distributive eﬀect of cooperation in the policy making stage exacerbates voters' incentive to appoint a higher
tax price representative in the electoral stage, which decreases public good provision.
Our results shed light on the debate over the structure of federal systems. Several competing principles have been invoked to
determine the optimal allocation of policy responsibilities between central and local governments. One of them, “cooperative
federalism,” states that federal policies should be negotiated by and “agreed to unanimously by the elected representatives from each
of the lower tier governments” (Inman and Rubinfeld, 1997). Our analysis suggests that strategic voting can greatly aﬀect the
supposed gains from cooperative federalism. Moreover, contrary to received wisdom (Oates, 1972), whether cooperative federalism
dominates decentralization depends neither on the heterogeneity of local preferences nor on the magnitude of externalities, but on
the curvature of the demand for the public good, and thus on the type of public good.
Our results can be related to the empirical literature on the demand for public goods. This literature typically assumes isoelastic
demand functions. For such demand functions, our results imply that cooperation is beneﬁcial if and only if the tax price elasticity of
the public good demand is greater than 1. Interestingly, empirical estimates of this elasticity vary greatly between public goods (see,
e.g., Feldstein, 1975; Brooks 2007). Hence, our results imply that the eﬃciency of interjurisdictional cooperation can diﬀer
importantly across types of public goods. Moreover, estimated elasticities are often smaller than one (Wildasin, 1987; Auten et al.,
2002). Therefore, this model suggests that for plausible speciﬁcations, strategic voting can severely oﬀset the gains from Coasian
cooperation between sovereign democracies. Hence, stronger forms of cooperation are required, such as pooling of sovereignty, or
explicit cost sharing.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 describes the basic good model. Section 4 derives the
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main results. Section 5 considers alternative bargaining solutions. Section 6 allows for transfers across countries. Section 7 considers
an alternative public good model with crowding out eﬀects. Section 8 relates the results to the empirical literature on the demand for
public goods.
2. Related literature
Since Olson (1965), the literature on collective action and public good provision has shown that the ineﬃciency of
noncooperative behavior is more severe and thus the potential gains from cooperation are greater when spillovers are large
(Oates, 1972; Sandler, 1998), or when preferences are homogeneous (Cornes, 1993). In contrast, in our model, the distribution of
spillovers and preferences do not matter. Our results diﬀer because the aforementioned literature focuses on the coordination failure
between policy makers whereas this paper assumes that policy makers cooperate eﬃciently, and focuses instead on the coordination
failure between voters of diﬀerent jurisdictions.
A number of papers have shown that strategic delegation via elections can distort the outcome of Coasian cooperation between
democratic jurisdictions. Brückner (2000) shows how to restore eﬃciency by appropriately allocating the proposal power. Harstad
(2008) focuses on the impact of transfers on electoral incentives. Kempf and Rossignol (2013) investigate how equity considerations
aﬀect the success of international agreements, but do not compare electoral equilibria with and without cooperation. In Section 5, we
show that once voters' incentives are taken into account, whether cooperation is beneﬁcial or not does not depend on how egalitarian
bargaining is. Most closely related to this paper, Segendorﬀ (1998), Gradstein (2004), and Buchholz et al. (2005) also investigate
whether strategic delegation oﬀsets the gains from international cooperation. Segendorﬀ (1998) and Gradstein (2004) consider a
symmetric, pure public good model, and a unilateral externality model with transfers, respectively. Our results show that their
conclusion are driven by their particular speciﬁcations for the cost structure of the public good, which determine the curvature of
their demand functions. Buchholz et al. (2005) consider a symmetric environment with transfers, and do not fully characterize the
determinants of the desirability of cooperation.3
This paper departs from the aforementioned contributions in that we focus on the empirically more relevant case in which
international cooperation is carried out without monetary transfers, and political leaders stay in place in case of negotiation failure.
More importantly, we consider a large class of public good environments and bargaining solutions, and characterize the conditions
under which strategic voting makes cooperation detrimental. Our analysis singles out the curvature of the demand for the public
good as the main driver of the cost of strategic voting. Even though this parameter has received a lot of attention in the empirical
literature (see Section 8), its central role has been overlooked by the theoretical literature on strategic delegation.
Some papers analyze the impact of strategic delegation on more institutionalized forms of cooperation (Chari et al., 1997;
Cheikbossian, 2000; Besley and Coate, 2003; Redoano and Scharf, 2004; Dur and Roelfsema, 2005; Harstad, 2010; Christiansen,
2013). These models diﬀer from ours in that cooperation is carried out through federal institutions, ﬁscal arrangements, and/or
majoritarian decision making. In contrast to the case of voluntary bargaining, these forms of cooperation generate electoral
incentives that lead to overprovision. Common ﬁscal pools induce voters to elect public good lovers to increase central spending in
their preferred public good. Majoritarian decision making leads to expropriation by the winning coalition, and thus induces voters to
elect representatives that are biased in favor of the public project so as to be included in the winning coalition.
3. The basic model
We consider an economy composed of two countries (which can also be viewed as members of a federation). Throughout,
c ∈ {1, 2} refers to an arbitrary country and c to the other country. Each country c is inhabited by a continuum of voters Ic, and for
all i I∈ c, i c( , ) refers to voter i in country c. The voters of country cmust choose the level of provision x ≥ 0c of a national public good
which can also be consumed to some degree by the residents of the other country, and which is ﬁnanced by the taxes of the voters of
country c. If p > 0c denotes the unit price of the public good and s > 0i c, the tax share of a voter i c( , ) which can vary across voters
because of income inequality then a level of provision xc requires a tax contribution p s xc i c c, from voter i c( , ).
3.1. Voters' preferences
The policy preferences of voter i c( , ) are derived from the following utility function:
U x t G x β G x s p x( ) = ( ( ) + ( )) − .i c i c c c c c c i c c c, , − − − , (1)
The term t G x β G x( ( ) + ( ))i c c c c c c, − − − in (1) corresponds to the utility that voter i c( , ) derives from the consumption of the domestic and
the foreign public goods, whereas the term s p x− i c c c, corresponds to the foregone consumption of private goods due to the tax
contribution needed to ﬁnance xc. Thus, t > 0i c, captures how voter i c( , ) trades oﬀ public good versus private goods consumption,
and the parameter β > 0c− captures the magnitude of the externality coming from the foreign public good.
Throughout, we assume that for all c ∈ {1, 2}, Gc is twice continuously diﬀerentiable on (0, + ∞), G c′ > 0, G c″ < 0,
G c xlim ′ ( )=+∞x→0 , and G c xlim ′ ( ) = 0x→∞ .
3 The relation between this paper and Segendorﬀ (1998) is discussed in Section 4.3. The relation with Gradstein (2004) and Buchholz et al. (2005) is discussed in
more detail in the working paper version (Loeper, 2015).
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Some remarks about the speciﬁcation (1) are in order. This speciﬁcation imposes minimal restrictions on the public good
technologies G1 and G2. As we shall see, this degree of freedom turns out to be crucial in our model. It also allows for any degree of
preferences heterogeneity within and across countries via the distributions of the preferences and tax parameters s( )i c i I, ∈ c, t( )i c i I, ∈ c, and
the public good prices p p( , )1 2 . Note that these parameters can capture diﬀerences across countries in population sizes, or in taxation/
public good provision eﬃciency. This speciﬁcation also allows for spillovers of arbitrary magnitude and asymmetries, via β β( , )1 2 .
Finally, note that x1 and x2 can be public as well as private goods. Their only distinctive features is that they are publicly provided
within each country, and that they spill over to the other country. However, to ﬁx ideas, in what follows, we refer to them as public
goods.
The speciﬁcation (1) makes two main simplifying assumptions. First, voters have separable preferences over the domestic and
the foreign public good, which means that voters' willingness to pay for their own public good is independent of the contribution of
the other country. We consider an alternative public good model that relaxes this assumption in Section 7, and show that the main
results are qualitatively unchanged. Second, the term s p x− i c c c, in (1) implicitly assumes that preferences are quasi linear in after tax
income. This assumption can be viewed as a ﬁrst order approximation which is justiﬁed if the cost of provision of the public good
under consideration is not a large share of the total budget of each country. In the working paper version (Loeper, 2015), we show
that our results can be easily adapted to allow for tax distortions that increase with the level of taxation, and for preferences that are
concave in after tax income.4
Finally, note that the separability and quasi linearity assumptions are widely used in the literature on strategic delegation in
public good settings, and the speciﬁcation (1) encompasses that of most models in this literature, which facilitates the comparison of
their results with ours.5
3.2. Individual tax prices and the demand for the public good
The utility function of voter i c( , ) in (1) can be rescaled as follows:
U p x G x β G x p x( , ) = ( ) + ( ) − ,c i c c c c c c i c c, − − − , (2)
where p s p t≡ /i c i c c i c, , , . Thus, the type pi c, completely characterizes the preferences of voter i c( , ). The type of the representative and
median voter of each country c are denoted by pc
r and pc
m, respectively, and we refer to a representative as “he” and to a voter as
“she”.
If voter i c( , ) could choose the policy of her own country xc taking the policy of the other country x c− as given, the resulting level of
public good would be G c p( ′ ) ( )i c
−1
, . Thus, one can interpret pi c, as her tax price for the public good, and the function D G c≡ ( ′ )c
−1 as the
public good demand function. Its tax price elasticity is deﬁned as usual as
ε p D c p p
D p
( ) ≡
′ ( )
( )
.c
c
To illustrate our results, we occasionally use the following speciﬁcation for Gc: for all x > 0c and ε > 0c ,
G x ε
ε
x( ) ≡
− 1
( ) .c c c
c
c
ε
ε
−1c
c
(3)
The public good demand induced by (3) is D p p( ) =c ε− c. Hence, its tax price elasticity is constant and equal to εc. If we let ε → 1c in (3),
G x x( ) → ln( )c c c , and the corresponding demand is D p p( ) = 1/c , which we refer to as the unit elastic demand function.
Deﬁnition 1. A demand function D is more (less) convex than another demand function D͠ if D f D= ( )͠ for some strictly convex
(concave) function f.
The order “more convex than” can be viewed as a generalization of “more elastic than” in the sense that they coincide on isoelastic
demand functions: if D and D͠ have a constant elasticity of ε and ε∼, respectively, D is more convex than D͠ if and only if ε ε> ∼.
Since the public good demand function and its curvature play a central role in our analysis, it is worth discussing their economic
meaning. Note that pi c, is not stricto censu a tax price, as it combines an actual tax price s pi c c, and a preference parameter ti c, .
Economists typically deﬁne and estimate public good demand functions as functions of the unit price pc or of the actual tax price
s pi c c, . However, in this model, deﬁning the public good demand of an individual as a function of pc or s pi c c, instead of pi c, would
amount to a change of price unit. Such changes aﬀect neither the elasticity nor the convexity of the demand curve.
3.3. Elections
We model the strategic interactions among voters and policy makers as a two stage game. In the ﬁrst stage the electoral stage
the voters of each country elect their respective representative, taking the representative of the other country as given. In the second
4 Note that the term s p x− i c c c, also implicitly assumes that the unit price of the public good pc is independent of level of provision. This assumption is without loss of
generality, as one can always measure the level of public good xc in terms of total cost of provision, change Gc accordingly, and normalize pc to 1.
5 To the best of our knowledge, all the papers on strategic delegation in public good settings assume quasi-linear preferences. Most of them also assume separable
preferences. For instance Segendorﬀ (1998), Cheikbossian (2000); Besley and Coate (2003), Gradstein (2004), Dur and Roelfsema (2005), or Kempf and Rossignol
(2013) use special cases of our speciﬁcation. An exception is Buchholz et al. (2005) who consider a public bad version of the model analyzed in Section 7.
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stage the policy making stage elected representatives set the policy of their respective country, cooperatively or noncooperatively.
To focus on the role of elections as delegation mechanisms and abstract away from other electoral eﬀects such as electoral
competition or political agency, we model national elections via a simpliﬁed “citizen candidate” model as in Persson and Tabellini
(1992). Representatives are selected from the pool of voters, and any voter is willing to become the representative of her country if
she receives enough votes. Candidates cannot make credible electoral promises (Alesina, 1988). Therefore, once elected, policy
makers behave according to their own preferences.
Voters are consequentialist and rational: they care only about the policies and can foresee how the type of their representative
aﬀect the policy outcome. Formally, for any proﬁle of representatives' types p p( , )r r1 2 elected in the electoral stage, if x p p( , )
PM r r
1 2
denotes the corresponding outcome in the policy making stage, then the induced preferences of voter i c( , ) on her representative pcr
is given by p U p x p p→ ( , ( , ))c
r
c i c
PM r r
, 1 2 .
To abstract away from the issue of voters' miscoordination, we assume that the election winner in a given country is the citizen
who is preferred by a majority of voters to any other candidate.6 The following proposition states that in our environment, the
national median type will always be pivotal in the electoral stage.
Lemma 1. For all c ∈ {1, 2}, for any pair of policy vectors x x, ′ ∈ +2 , a majority of voters in country c prefer x to x′ if and only if
the median type pc
m prefers x to x′.
Therefore, in the electoral stage, irrespective of the outcome of the policy making stage, the induced majority preferences of the
voters of country c on their representative pc
r always coincide with the induced preferences of pc
m.
Depending on the nature of the public good, voting on the type of the representative can be interpreted as choosing a candidate
with a particular belief about the intrinsic value of the public good (e.g., a global warming skeptic, a monetarist in the case of ﬁscal
stimulus, or an anti immigration politician in the case of political asylum), a special inclination towards the polluting industry or the
environmental lobbies, or a candidate who seek the support of voters from a particular income group, and thus from voters with a
particular tax price.
4. Public good provision by elected representatives
4.1. The noncooperative regime
We ﬁrst analyze the benchmark case in which policy makers behave noncooperatively. Formally, we assume that in the policy
making stage, for any proﬁle of representatives pr appointed in the electoral stage, the elected representative of each country c
chooses the policy xc that maximizes his welfare, taking the policy of the other country x c− as given. The unique dominant strategy
for each representative is x D p= ( )c c c
r , so the outcome of the policy making stage game is:
x p D p( ) = ( ).cN r c c
r
(4)
One can see from (4) that this policy outcome is independent of β: in the absence of cooperation, policy makers fail to internalize the
cross border externalities.
Given the outcome of the policy making stage x (. )N , the equilibrium of the electoral stage is deﬁned by backward induction as
follows:
Deﬁnition 2. A representative's type pc
r is a noncooperative electoral best response of the voters of country c to some p c
r
− if for all
p > 0c , x p p( , )
N
c
r
c
r
− is majority preferred in country c to x p p( , )
N
c c
r
− . A proﬁle of type p
r is a noncooperative electoral equilibrium
(henceforth NEE) if for all c ∈ {1, 2}, pcr is a noncooperative electoral best response to p c
r
− .
Proposition 1. The noncooperative electoral best response of the voters of country c to any p > 0c
r
− is to elect their median voter
pc
m, and the corresponding level of public good in country c is x p D p( ) = ( )cN c
m
c c
m . Thus, the unique NEE is p p=r m. In the NEE, both
public goods are underprovided: there exists a policy vector x that is strictly preferred to x x p= ( )NEE N m by a majority of voters in
both countries, and for any such x, x x> NEE1 1 and x x> NEE2 2 .
The intuition for Proposition 1 is as follows. Lemma 1 implies that the noncooperative electoral best response of country c to
some p c
r
− is the type pc
r most preferred by its median voter pc
m, given the policy outcome p x p p→ ( , )c
r N
c
r
c
r
− . From (4), pc
r determines
xc
N but does not aﬀect x cN− . Therefore, the delegation game in the electoral stage is strategically equivalent to a game in which each
median voter pc
m chooses the policy of her country xc, taking the policy of the other country x c− as given. As a result, in the NEE,
pc
m chooses her most preferred level of public good x D p= ( )cNEE c c
m . The ineﬃciency of the NEE follows from the fact that median
voters do not internalize externalities.
4.2. The cooperative regime
In view of Proposition 1, a natural question is whether Coasian cooperation between policy makers can mitigate the
6 One can model elections as a normal-form game in which the strategy of each voter is the individual for whom she votes, and the outcome is the policy vector
induced by the type of the plurality winner. This game typically has multiple Nash equilibria (e.g., all voters voting for a given type). However, whenever a type is a
Condorcet winner, there is a strong Nash equilibrium in which a majority of voters vote for a candidate of that type, and all strong Nash equilibria are outcome
equivalent, consistently with our assumption.
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underprovision of the public good that arises in the NEE. To address this question, we modify the game analyzed in Section 4.1 by
letting representatives cooperate in the policy making stage. Speciﬁcally, for a given proﬁle of representative pr elected in the
electoral stage, we assume that the outcome of the policy making stage, which we denote x p( )B r , is the generalized Nash bargaining
solution for the elected representatives. We set the bargaining default to be the equilibrium x p( )N r that arises if representatives
choose their respective policy noncooperatively, as characterized in (4).
Formally, for all policy vector x ∈ +2 , let Δ x p( , )c r denote the payoﬀ gain for representative pcr from implementing x instead of
the bargaining default x p( )N r . That is,
Δ p x U p x U p x p( , ) ≡ ( , ) − ( , ( )).c r c c
r
c c
r N r
(5)
Then x p( )B r is the policy vector that solves

B Δ p x Δ p xmax ( ( , ), ( , )),
x
r r
∈
1 2
+
2 (6)
where B Δ Δ π Δ π Δ( , ) ≡ ln( ) + ln( )1 2 1 1 2 2 , and π > 0c is the bargaining power of each country c. As shown in the Appendix A (see Lemma
2), the program (6) has a unique solution, and it satisﬁes
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟⎟x p D
p
β
( ) =
1 +
,cB r c c
r
c
B p
B p
( )
( )
c
r
c
r
−
(7)
where
B p B
Δ
Δ p x p( ) ≡ ∂
∂
( ( , ( ))).c r c
c
r B r
(8)
In words, Bc is the utilitarian weight that the bargaining program (6) attaches to country c at its solution x p( )B r . So the ratio B B/c c− in
(7) is the rate at which the bargaining function B trades oﬀ the gains from cooperation between the two representatives. If we take
this ratio as an exogenous parameter in the formula (7), then as B B/c c− increases, the policy vector xB remains Pareto optimal for the
two representatives, but xc
B increases whereas x cB− decreases, so the cooperative outcome becomes less favorable to pcr and more
favorable to p c
r
− . Thus, the ratio B B/c c− captures the distributive eﬀect of cooperation.
A few remarks about the cooperative regime are in order. First, even though countries' representatives cooperate, both countries
remain sovereign in that representatives are elected by their respective electorate, policies are ﬁnanced at the national level, and the
bargaining outcome is mutually beneﬁcial for the elected representatives. Second, the Nash bargaining solution is arguably the most
natural way to capture the unstructured and voluntary nature of Coasian cooperation between leaders of sovereign jurisdictions. We
consider alternative bargaining solutions in Section 5. Third, transfers across countries are ruled out. We relax that assumption in
Section 6. Finally, the bargaining default x p( )N r implicitly assumes that the elected representatives pr stay in power in case of
negotiation breakdown. This assumption is consistent with the empirical observation that reelections are rarely held on the ground
that representatives failed to reach an agreement.7
Given the outcome of the policy making stage x p( )B r , the equilibrium in the electoral stage is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 3. A representative's type pc
r is a cooperative electoral best response of the voters of country c to some p c
r
− if for all
p > 0c , x p p( , )
B
c
r
c
r
− is majority preferred in country c to x p p( , )
B
c c
r
− . A proﬁle of type p
r is a cooperative electoral equilibrium
(henceforth CEE) if for all c ∈ {1, 2}, pcr is a cooperative electoral best response to p c
r
− .
The comparison of (4) with (7) shows that cooperation prescribes policy makers to behave as if their tax price was
p
β B B1 + /
c
r
c c c−
instead of pc
r. Hence, cooperation requires each representative to behave as if his public good was subsidized at a rate τ =c
β B B
β B B
/
1 + /
c c c
c c c
−
−
. The externality parameter βc in that rate corresponds to eﬃciency eﬀect of cooperation that is, the internalization of
externalities whereas the ratio B B/c c− corresponds to the distributive eﬀect of cooperation. Since τ > 0c , x p x p( ) > ( )cB r cN r , which
means that holding the proﬁle of representatives pr constant, cooperation unambiguously increases public good provision. However,
the next proposition shows that once voters' incentives are taken into account, whether cooperation increases public good provision
depends on whether the distributive eﬀect of cooperation, as captured by the ratio B B/c c− , is tilted in favor of higher or lower tax price
representatives.
Proposition 2. For all c ∈ {1, 2} and p > 0c
r
− , there exists a cooperative electoral best response for the voters of country c. For any
proﬁle of type pr, if pr
c is a cooperative electoral best response to p c
r
− , the corresponding level of public good x p( )c
B r in country c is
strictly smaller (greater) than at the noncooperative best response of country c to any p∼ c
r
− if < 0 ( > 0)
B B
p
∂[ / ]
∂
c c
c
r
− .
Proposition 2 states the following intuitive result: if the distributive eﬀect of cooperation becomes more favorable to country c as
the tax price of its representative pc
r increases that is, if B B p∂[ / ]/∂ < 0c c c
r
− then the distributive eﬀect of cooperation exacerbates
voters' incentives to elect a high tax price representative, which decreases public good provision.
Proposition 1 further states that the sign of B B p∂[ / ]/∂c c c
r
− is the only determinant of the comparison between the cooperative and
noncooperative electoral equilibrium. The intuition behind that result is that the distributive eﬀect determines whether at the
7 See Segendorﬀ (1998) and Gradstein (2004) for more on this issue.
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electoral stage of the cooperative regime, a greater contribution by the voters of a given country increases or crowds out the
contribution of the other country. To see why, note that as in the noncooperative regime, when choosing the tax price of her
representative pc
r, the voters of country c indirectly choose their country's contribution: xc
B increases as they elect a representative
with a lower tax price (see Lemma 4 in the Appendix A). However, in contrast to the noncooperative regime, when choosing their
contribution xc
B via the type of their representative pc
r, they do not take the contribution of the other country x cB− as given. For
instance, when B B p∂[ / ]/∂ < 0c c c
r
− , we see from (7) that x p∂ /∂ > 0cB c
r
− . This means that as the voters of country c increase their
contribution xc
B (by decreasing pc
r), they decrease the contribution of the other country x cB− , which is detrimental to them. This
distributive eﬀect of cooperation reduce their incentive to provide their public good, relative to the noncooperative regime.
4.3. When does cooperation increase public good provision?
The next proposition states our main result using the notion of convexity in Deﬁnition 1.
Proposition 3. For any c ∈ {1, 2}, if Dc is more (less) convex than the unit elastic demand 1/p, any CEE yields strictly more (less)
public good in country c than the NEE irrespective of the other parameters of the model.
The most striking result in Proposition 3 is that once voters' incentives are taken into account, whether cooperation increases
public good provision depends neither on the magnitude nor on the asymmetries of the spillovers, as captured by β, nor on voters'
preferences as captured by the distribution of pi c, within and across countries, nor on the allocation of bargaining power, as captured
by π. This result may appear surprising, since these parameters are the main drivers of the impact of cooperation in the policy
making stage.
To illustrate the intuition behind this result, consider for instance an increase in the spillovers from country c or a decrease in its
bargaining power that is, an increase in βc or a decrease in πc. If we ﬁx the proﬁle of representatives pr, one can see from (4) and (7)
that these parameter changes do not aﬀect the noncooperative policy equilibrium xN, whereas they increase the provision of public
good by country c in the cooperative policy outcome xB. Thus, they increase the additional tax payment that cooperation requires
from the voters of country c. The rational response of the voters of country c is to mitigate the greater cost of cooperation in the
policy making stage by electing a higher tax price representative in the electoral stage. Hence, the impact of these parameter changes
in the policy making stage of the cooperative regime is oﬀset by voters' noncooperative behavior in the electoral stage. This intuition
explains why cooperation can be detrimental even for arbitrarily severe externalities, and thus even when the potential gains from
cooperation are arbitrarily large.
The second result stated by Proposition 3 is that whether cooperation increases public good provision depends only on the public
good technology Gc, via the curvature of the public good demand function Dc: cooperation is beneﬁcial only when Dc is suﬃciently
convex. The intuition for this result is more involved and is best explained through a sketch of the proof, which we provide at the end
of this section.
Proposition 3 can be rephrased as a decentralization theorem in the spirit of Oates (1972). Suppose that countries 1 and 2 form a
federal system, that the noncooperative regime is interpreted as decentralization, and that centralization takes the form of voluntary
cooperation among the members of the federation (“cooperative federalism” , as coined by Inman and Rubinfeld (1997)). Then
Proposition 3 states that in sharp contrast to Oates' decentralization theorem, the comparative advantage of centralization depends
neither on the heterogeneity of local preferences, nor on the magnitude of externalities. Instead, it depends only on the curvature of
the demand for the public good.8
Most empirical papers on public good demand consider parametrized families of demand functions (see the discussion in Section
8). Our results can be readily applied to any such parametrized family. For instance, in the canonical case of the isoelastic public
good demand speciﬁed in (3), Proposition 3 implies the following.
Corollary 1. For any c ∈ {1, 2}, if Dc has a constant tax price elasticity εc, then irrespective of the other parameters of the model,
any CEE yields strictly more (less) public good in country c than the NEE if ε ε> 1 ( < 1)c c .
Segendorﬀ (1998, Proposition 3) considers the same model as ours, with G x G x x( ) = ( ) = − exp(− )1 2 , β β= = 11 2 , and π π=1 2. In
that case, D p p( ) = ln(1/ )c , so Deﬁnition 1 and Proposition 3 imply that public good provision is lower in any CEE than in the NEE, but
that result is driven solely by the particular public good technology assumed in that paper.
We conclude this section with a sketch of the proof of Proposition 3. As shown in Proposition 2, the equilibrium impact of
cooperation in country c depends on how the tax price of its representative pc
r aﬀects the distributive eﬀect of cooperation, as
captured by B B/c c− . To understand the role of the curvature of Dc, it is enough to focus on the eﬀect of pcr on Bc, which is the
utilitarian weight allocated to representative c by the bargaining function B. In the case of Nash bargaining, Bc is inversely
proportional to his gains from cooperation. This relationship captures the need for Coasian cooperation to be mutually beneﬁcial,
and thus to share the gains from cooperation. Hence, to tilt the distributive eﬀect of cooperation in their favor i.e., to increase the
utilitarian weight of their representative voters have an incentive to choose the tax price of their representative so as to reduce his
gains from cooperation. These electoral incentives formalize Schelling's insight (Schelling, 1960) that a successful bargaining
8 Besley and Coate (2003) consider a model of federalism with strategic delegation in which the magnitude of spillovers aﬀects the desirability of centralization, as
in Oates' decentralization theorem. The key diﬀerence between this model and ours is that the cost of public good provision is shared by all districts. The common
pool eﬀect generated by this ﬁscal arrangement induces voters to elect public good lovers to increase central spending in their preferred public good. These incentives
are socially less costly when local public goods have greater spillovers. See also Harstad (2007) or Loeper (2011) on alternative models in which Oates'
decentralization no longer holds.
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strategy is to delegate the negotiations to an agent who has less to lose in case of negotiation breakdown.
How can voters implement Schelling's strategy in our setting? Recall that as argued in Section 4.2, cooperation requires
representative c to behave as if his tax price pc
r was subsidized at a rate τ =c
β B B
β B B
/
1 + /
c c c
c c c
−
−
even though the subsidy is not actually paid.
Thus, his cost of cooperation is simply the deadweight loss of the “as if” subsidy τc, whereas his beneﬁt from cooperation is the
spillover eﬀect of the “as if” subsidy τ c on the tax price of the other representative. If we assume for simplicity that τc and τ−c are
constant, pc
r aﬀects the cost but not the beneﬁt of cooperation for representative c. Therefore, electing a representative with smaller
gains from cooperation means electing a representative whose deadweight loss of the “as if” subsidy τc is greater. How this
deadweight loss varies with the tax price of the representative turns out to depend on the curvature of the demand function: the
deadweight loss of a proportional subsidy τc, as given by the well known Harberger formula, increases (decreases) in the pre subsidy
price pc
r when the demand function Dc is less (more) convex than the unit elastic demand. To see this formally, note that this
deadweight loss equals
∫DWL G D p p D p G D τ p p D τ p t t t p D c t p dt≡ ( ( )) − ( ) − [ ( ((1 − ) )) − ((1 − ) )] = − (1 − ) ((1 − ) ) ′ ((1 − ) ) .c c c
r
c
r
c c
r
c c c c
r
c
r
c c c
r τ
c
r
c
r
0 2
2c
The second equation, which follows from elementary calculus, shows that DWL increases (decreases) in pc
r when p p D c p→ ′ ( )2 is
decreasing (increasing), or equivalently when Dc is less (more) convex than 1/p. Thus, the convexity of the demand for the public
good matters because it determines whether a higher tax price representative has smaller gains from cooperation, and thus whether
voters' incentives to tilt the distributive eﬀect of cooperation in their favor induce them to appoint a higher tax price representatives.9
4.4. When is cooperation socially beneﬁcial?
Proposition 1 shows that the ineﬃciency of the NEE is due to the underprovision of the public good. Therefore, when cooperation
further decreases public good provision that is, when voters' demand function for the public good is not too convex it should be
socially detrimental. The following proposition formalizes this intuition.
Proposition 4. For any c ∈ {1, 2}, if Dc is less convex than the unit elastic demand, then a majority of voters in country c are
strictly worse oﬀ in any CEE than in the NEE.
The following proposition provides a partial converse to Proposition 4.
Proposition 5. If D1 and D2 are more convex than the unit elastic demand, then in at least one country, a majority of voters is
strictly better oﬀ in the CEE than in the NEE.
If countries are further symmetric that is, D D=1 2, β β=1 2, p p=
m m
1 2 and π π=1 2 then in both countries, a majority of voters
are strictly better oﬀ in any symmetric CEE than in the NEE.
Thus, Propositions 3 5 show that whether we look at public good provision or voters' welfare, the equilibrium impact of
cooperation depends primarily on the degree of convexity of voters' public good demand function.
Note that from Proposition 3, when both D1 and D2 are more convex than the unit elastic demand, cooperation increases public
good provision in both countries, but even in that case, Proposition 5 does not guarantee that cooperation is beneﬁcial for a majority
of voters in both countries. The intuition for this result is that the eﬀort that cooperation requires in terms of extra public good
provision may not be shared suﬃciently equally across countries. To understand the reason for this asymmetric impact of
cooperation, note ﬁrst that if median voters appointed themselves in the cooperative regime, Coasian cooperation would always
beneﬁt both of them, and from Lemma 1, it would beneﬁt a majority of voters in both countries. Thus, the excessively unequal
impact of cooperation must come from the diﬀerences in voters' incentives for strategic delegation. The intuition given in Section 4
suggests that the strength of these incentives is negatively related to the degree of convexity of their public good demand function.
This suggests that in the electoral equilibrium, cooperation will require a relatively greater eﬀort from the country whose public good
technology Gc induces the more convex public good demand. Cooperation might thus be detrimental to the voters of this country
even when it result in more public good in both countries. The following proposition formalizes this intuition in the case in which one
country has a unit elastic demand.
Proposition 6. Suppose Dc is unit elastic and D c− is more convex than Dc. Then a majority of voters in country c are strictly better
oﬀ in any CEE than in the NEE, but a majority of voters in country c are strictly worse oﬀ in any CEE than in the NEE.10
9 In the Appendix A (see the footnote at the proof of Lemma 5), we explain the connection between this sketch of the proof and the actual proof. Note that for
brevity, we have considered only the eﬀect of pc
r on the terms of cooperation B B/c c− through its eﬀect on Bc. But a change in pcr also aﬀects B B/c c− through B c− .
However, it turns out that the latter eﬀect always go in the same direction as the former eﬀect. To see this, recall that B c− is inversely proportional to the gains of
cooperation of representative c, so pc
r aﬀects these gains via the spillover eﬀect of the “as if” subsidy τc on the tax price of representative c. This spillover eﬀect is
given by
∫ ′
S β G D τ p G D p
β t p D t p dt
≡ [ ( ((1 − ) )) − ( ( ))]
= − [((1 − ) ) ((1 − ) )] ,
c c c c c
r
c c c
r
c
τc
t c
r
c c
r
− − − − − − − −
− 0
1
1 −
2
where the second equality follows from elementary calculus. Thus the spillover eﬀect S increases (decreases) in pr when p p D c p→ ′ ( )2 is decreasing (increasing). In
this case, an increase in pc
r increases (decreases) not only the cost of cooperation for representative c but also the beneﬁt of cooperation for representative c, and
both eﬀects aﬀect the terms of cooperation in the same way.
10 Note that when Dc is unit elastic, and D c− is more convex than Dc, Proposition 3 imply that in any CEE, the contribution of country c is strictly greater than in the
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Note that Proposition 6 holds irrespective of the degree of asymmetry in the externalities, in the bargaining power, and in voters'
preferences across countries. Thus, Proposition 6 conﬁrms the above intuition that once voters' incentives are taken into account, it
is the asymmetry in the degree of curvature of D1 and D2 that drives the distributive impact of cooperation.
4.5. Equilibrium existence
Proposition 1 shows that a NEE always exists. From Proposition 2, a cooperative electoral best response always exists. The next
proposition further shows that a CEE exists under standard speciﬁcations of the functions G1 andG2, as well as when spillovers that
are not too large.12
Proposition 7. For any pm, β, and π, if G1 and G2 are given by the isoelastic speciﬁcation (3) with ε = 1, ε = 2, 11 or with ε
suﬃciently large, then a CEE exists. For any G1, G2, pm, and π, for β suﬃciently small, a CEE exists.
Note also that for the sake of clarity, our main results are stated as equilibrium properties, but we show in the Appendix A (see
Propositions 15 17 that they can also be stated as properties of the cooperative electoral best response of a given country, which
always exists from Proposition 2.
5. Alternatives bargaining solutions
The basic model uses Nash bargaining to model Coasian cooperation among policy makers. The choice of this bargaining solution
is motivated by its desirable properties,13 and its widespread use. Nevertheless, our results hold unchanged for a much larger class of
bargaining function.14 Speciﬁcally, the proofs only assume that the function B Δ Δ( , )1 2 used in the bargaining program (6) is
diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing in Δ1 and Δ2, and that for all c ∈ {1, 2},
Δ p x p( , ( )) ≥ 0,c r B r (9)
and
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
B
Δ
B
Δ
Δ
∂ ∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
> 0.c c
c
−
(10)
That B is increasing in each coordinate is equivalent to assuming that the bargaining outcome is Pareto eﬃcient. Assumption (9)
captures the requirement that B must be such that the bargaining outcome x p( )B r is mutually beneﬁcial. Assumption (10) can be
viewed as a property of diminishing marginal rate of substitution. This property has a natural distributive interpretation: the ratio
/BΔ
B
Δ
∂
∂
∂
∂c c−
is the rate at which the function B trades oﬀ the gains from cooperation among the two representatives. So (10) requires that
as the bargaining default of agent c increases, and thus as his gain from cooperation Δc decreases, the marginal rate of substitution
/BΔ
B
Δ
∂
∂
∂
∂c c−
decreases, and thus becomes more favorable to him.15
To illustrate these assumptions, consider for instance the C.E.S. speciﬁcation for the bargaining function B: for all π π, > 01 2 and
ρ < 1,
B Δ Δ ρ π Δ π Δ( , ) ≡ ( ( ) + ( ) ) ,ρ ρ ρ ρ1 2 −1 1 1 2 2 1/
where π > 0c is the bargaining power of country c. One can easily show that Bρ satisﬁes all of the above properties. The limit case
(footnote continued)
NEE, whereas the contribution of country c is the same in the CEE as in the NEE. However, it should be clear that by continuity, the same result applies if Dc is
isoelastic with elasticity εc greater than but suﬃciently close to 1. In that case, the contribution of both countries is strictly greater in the CEE than in the NEE, but one
country would still have a majority of voters strictly worse oﬀ in the CEE than in the NEE.
12 Even though we were unable to ﬁnd parameters values in (1) for which a CEE does not exist, it is diﬃcult to establish the existence of a CEE for arbitrary
parameter values. The reason is as follows. A CEE is basically the Nash equilibrium of a delegation game between the two median voters. The usual ﬁxed point
theorems used to prove equilibrium existence require the best response of each median voter i.e., the set of representative's types pc
r most preferred by pc
m, given
the policy outcome p x p→ ( )r B r to have a closed graph, and to be convex. The former property follows immediately from the maximum theorem, and from the
continuity of the mapping p x p→ ( )c
r B r and x U p x→ ( , )c c
m . The latter property is harder to establish, because the bargaining program (6) that deﬁnes x p( )B r typically
does not have a closed form solution, so the induced preferences of the median voters on his representative's type are diﬃcult to characterize. The proof of Proposition
7 basically shows that in all the cases in which we were able to solve (6) analytically or asymptotically, the best response of each median voter is unique, and thus
convex.
11 The isoelastic public good demand with ε = 1 and ε = 2 correspond to the public good technologyG x x( ) = ln( ) andG x x( ) = , respectively, as assumed in Besley
and Coate (2003) and Gradstein (2004).
13 In particular, the scale invariance property of the generalized Nash bargaining solution implies that rescaling (1) as (2) is without loss of generality. Without the
scale invariance property, our results might depend on the particular aﬃne transformation of (1) we use as inputs for the bargaining solution.
14 The only results that are derived speciﬁcally for the Nash bargaining solution are Proposition 7 on the existence of a CEE (but Proposition 8 below shows that a
CEE also exists with utiliarian bargaining), and Propositions 9 and 10 on the role of transfers.
15 Note also that /BΔ c
B
Δc
∂
∂ −
∂
∂ diﬀers from the ratio B B/c c− introduced in Section 4.2 in that the latter is evaluated at Δ Δ p x p= ( , ( ))
r B r , whereas /BΔ c
B
Δc
∂
∂ −
∂
∂ is evaluated at
any Δ ∈ +2 , and is thus an intrinsic property of the bargaining function B. Assumption (10) on /BΔ c
B
Δc
∂
∂ −
∂
∂ captures Schelling's intuition (1960) that a player who has
less to loose from a negotiation breakdown is able to negotiate a better deal. To see that (10) is a mild assumption, note that with transferable utility, if we reverse the
inequality in (10), then the bargaining solution always allocate all of the surplus to one agent.
9
ρ → − ∞ corresponds to egalitarian bargaining, the intermediate case ρ → 0 to Nash bargaining, and the limit case ρ → 1 to
utilitarian bargaining. Thus, as ρ increases, Bρ puts a greater weight on eﬃciency i.e., maximizing the total gains from
cooperation relative to distributive concerns i.e., allocating the gains from cooperation in a mutually beneﬁcial and equitable
way. That our results hold unchanged for any such function Bρ shows that the equilibrium impact of cooperation is unaﬀected by
how the bargaining process trades oﬀ eﬃciency and distributive concerns, as long as it puts some positive weight on the latter.
This conclusion contrasts with the ﬁndings in Kempf and Rossignol (2013) that equity considerations may aﬀect the feasibility of
international agreements. The diﬀerence between our results and theirs comes from the fact that they compare cooperation and no
cooperation holding the identity of the policy makers ﬁxed. Thus, they abstract away from the impact of cooperation on voters'
incentives, which is the main focus of this paper.
As argued at the end of Section 4.3, the role of the curvature of the public good demand in our results is driven by the distributive
eﬀect of Coasian cooperation among the representatives, as captured by Properties (9) and (10). One can formalize this intuition by
considering the limit case of utilitarian bargaining. This bargaining solution maximizes the gains from cooperation irrespective of
any distributive concerns. Formally, when ρ = 1, π π/ = /BΔ
B
Δ c c
∂
∂
∂
∂ −c c
1
−
1
, which is independent of Δ, so Property (10) is violated. Utilitarian
bargaining also violates Property (9) in our model when pr is suﬃciently heterogeneous. In line with the above intuition, the
following proposition shows that when these distributive properties are violated, the equilibrium impact of cooperation is still
independent of voters' preferences and the magnitude of externalities, as under Nash bargaining, but it is also independent of the
curvature of Dc.
Proposition 8. Suppose representatives use the utilitarian bargaining solution in the policy making stage of the cooperative
regime. Then there exists a unique CEE, and it leads to the same policy outcome as the NEE.
6. Transfers
Side payments are usually beneﬁcial in bargaining situations because they increase the potential gains from cooperation. In this
section, we investigate whether they remain beneﬁcial when negotiations are conducted by representatives elected by strategic
voters. To do so, we modify the basic model of Section 3 and assume that each country can costlessly transfer some of its tax receipts
to the other country. Formally, in the utility function (1) of an arbitrary voter i c( , ), the term s p xi c c c, that captures her tax payment is
replaced by s p x t( + )i c c c c, , where tc denotes the transfer made by state c to the other state, with t t+ = 01 2 . As in the basic model, we
rescale the utility function as follows
⎧
⎨
⎩
V x t G x β G x p x p t
V x t G x β G x p x αp t
( , ) = ( ) + ( ) − + ,
( , ) = ( ) + ( ) − − ,
i i i
i i i
,1 1 1 2 2 2 ,1 1 ,1
,2 2 2 1 1 1 ,2 2 ,2
where t t p≡ − /1 , α p p≡ /1 2 is the production eﬃciency of country 2 relative to country1, and pi c, is as in the basic model. The NEE and
CEE are deﬁned as in Section 4 (see Deﬁnitions 2 and 3).
Clearly, no transfers are made in the policy making stage of the noncooperative regime, so the characterization of the NEE in
Proposition 1 holds unchanged. In the cooperative regime, the outcome of the policy making stage is the solution to (6) with
transfers, which yields
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟
⎛
⎝
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⎞
⎠
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟
x p D
p
β
p
αp
D
p
β
αp
p
( ) =
1 +
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1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
1 (11)
At the solution of (6), the transfer t p( )B r equalizes the gains from cooperation across representatives, where gains are weighted by the
bargaining power and the tax price of each representative.
For the sake of brevity, we focus on two polar cases: symmetric countries with complete spillovers, and unilateral spillovers. The
ﬁrst case is interesting in that with symmetric countries and representatives, no transfers are made and the level of public good
provision is the same as in the basic model without transfers. However, the availability of transfers aﬀect voters' incentives to deviate
from a symmetric equilibrium at the electoral stage. Thus, the symmetric case allows us to isolate the impact of transfers on voters'
incentives at the electoral stage.
Proposition 9. Assume p p=m m1 2 , D D=1 2, α = 1, and β β= = 11 2 . Then there exists ε ∈ (1, 2) such that if D is more (less) convex
than D p p( ) ≡ ε− , any symmetric CEE yields strictly more (less) public good than the NEE. Numerically, ε ≃ 1.37.
Proposition 9 shows that the availability of transfers does not change the qualitative nature of the results of the basic model.
First, cooperation can be harmful even in the case of complete spillovers, in which the potential gains from cooperation are greatest.
Second, cooperation is beneﬁcial only when the demand function for the public good is suﬃciently convex.
The comparison of Propositions 3 and 9 further reveals that cooperation is more likely to be beneﬁcial without transfers. In
particular, when D is more convex than p−1 and less convex than p ε− for instance when D p p( ) = ε− for some ε ε∈ (1, ) cooperation
is beneﬁcial without transfers but detrimental with transfers. Hence, once voters' incentives are taken into account, the availability of
transfers may decrease the gains from cooperation. To see why, consider the incentives of the median voter of country c to marginally
increase pc
r from a symmetric proﬁle p p=c
r
c
r
− . When transfers are allowed, from (11), this deviation decreases the provision of both
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public goods by the same amount, but representative c is compensated by a transfer from country c for his greater cost of provision.
When transfers are ruled out, increasing pc
r decreases public good provision to a greater extent, because the greater cost of provision
of representative c cannot be compensated by a transfer from country c. Since the median voter of country c cares more about
public good consumption than her representative, she is more likely to beneﬁt from the deviation in the former case, because it leads
to a smaller decline in public good consumption than in the latter case.
We now turn to the opposite case of a unilateral externality, and assume that β = 02 while all other parameters can take arbitrary
values. If we ﬁx the proﬁle of representatives, transfers are necessary for cooperation to be beneﬁcial in this setup. To see this, note
that in the absence of transfer, β = 02 implies that country 2 has nothing to oﬀer to country 1, so the requirement that cooperation be
mutually beneﬁcial implies that for any p ∈r ++2 , x p x p( ) = ( )B r N r . As a result, the unique CEE is p p=r m, and it is outcome
equivalent to the NEE. When transfers are feasible, one can see from (11) that if we ﬁx the proﬁle of representative pr, cooperation
leaves the level of public good 2 unchanged, but it strictly increases the provision of public good 1, and country 2 makes a transfer to
country 1 to compensate its voters for the greater cost of provision. However, the next proposition shows that once voters' incentives
are taken into account, cooperation can still be detrimental.
Proposition 10. Assume β = 02 while all other parameters are arbitrary. Then any CEE yields strictly less public good in country
2 than the NEE, and if D1 is more (less) convex than D p p( ) ≡ −2, any CEE yields strictly more (less) public good in country 1.
Proposition 10 shows that whether cooperation increases the provision of the public good with the spillover eﬀect depends solely
on the degree of convexity of its demand function, as in the basic model. However, cooperation always decreases the provision of the
public good without the spillover eﬀect. Equivalently, the median voter of country 2 always elects a representative with a higher tax
price than herself. This electoral strategy is proﬁtable to her because it decreases the provision of both public goods, but it also
decreases the transfer paid by her country to compensate country 1. Since this lower transfer is negotiated by a representative who
cares more than her about after tax income relative to public good consumption, it more than oﬀsets the eﬀect of lower public good
consumption for her.
The comparison of Propositions 3 and 10 also reveals that when D1 is more convex than p−1 but less convex than p−2, cooperation
decreases the provision of both public goods when transfers are available, whereas it has no eﬀect when transfers are ruled out. Thus,
as in the symmetric setup, the availability of transfers can make cooperation detrimental.
7. A model with crowding out
As argued in Section 3.1, the main simplifying assumption of the basic model is that voters have separable preferences over the
two public goods. This assumption implies that there is no crowding out in the policy making stage of the noncooperative regime:
the willingness of a representative to pay for his public good does not depend on the level of public good in the other country. As a
result, there is no strategic delegation in the NEE (see Proposition 1). To investigate whether our main results depend on that
assumption, we modify the model of Section 3 and consider another widely used public good model in which the contribution of one
country crowds out the contribution of the other country.
The policy xc of each country c is the level of provision of an input (e.g., pollution abatement) that is necessary to produce a
public good (e.g., air quality). Voters consume only the public good of their own country, but the quantity gc they can consume
depends both on their own contribution xc and on the contribution of the other country x c− . Speciﬁcally, g x β x= +c c c c− − , and the
preferences of voter i c( , ) are given by
U x t G x β x s p x( ) = ( + ) − ,i c i c c c c c i c c c, , − − , (12)
where the parameters ti c, , si c, , and pc have the same interpretation as in the basic model. We further assume that β β ≤ 11 2 .
16 As in the
basic model, if we denote p s p t≡ /i c i c c i c, , , , the preferences of voter i c( , ) can equivalently be represented by the following utility function
U p x G x β x p x( , ) = ( + ) − .c i c c c c c i c c, − − , (13)
If country c was the only contributor (i.e., x = 0c− ) and voter i c( , ) could decide the contribution of her country, she would choose
a level of public good g x G c p= = ( ′ ) ( )c c i c
−1
, . Thus D Gc≡ ( ′ )c
−1 and pi c, can still be interpreted as the public good demand function, and
pi c, as the tax price of voter i c( , ).
The noncooperative and cooperative electoral equilibria are deﬁned as in the basic model. Since Lemma 1 also holds in this
model, the NEE and the CEE are still the Nash equilibria of a game in which the median voters choose the type of their own
representative, and the outcome is x p( )N r and x p( )B r , respectively, where xN and xB are constructed as in the basic model (see
Sections 4.1 and 4.2).
7.1. The noncooperative regime
Let pr be a proﬁle of representative appointed in the electoral stage of the noncooperative regime. In the policy making stage, if
representative pc
r expects the other country to set a policy x c− , his best response is to set x D p β x= max {0, ( ) − }c c c
r
c c− − . Thus, in
contrast to the basic model, policies are strategic substitutes.
16 This assumption guarantees that the equilibrium in the policy-making stage of the noncooperative scenario is unique.
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Proposition 11. For any pr, the unique equilibrium of the policy making stage is
⎧
⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪
⎩
⎪⎪⎪⎪
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
⎡
⎣
⎢⎢
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
x p
D p
D p
D p
β
D p β D p
β β
D p β D p
β β
D p
D p
β
β
D p
D p
D p β
( ) =
(0, ( )) if
( )
( )
∈ [0, ],
( ) − ( )
1 −
,
( ) − ( )
1 −
if
( )
( )
∈ , 1 ,
( ( ), 0) if
( )
( )
∈ 1 , + ∞ .
N r
r
r
r
r r r r r
r
r
r
r
2 2
1 1
2 2
2
1 1 2 2 2
1 2
2 2 1 1 1
1 2
1 1
2 2
2
1
1 1
1 1
2 2 1 (14)
The equilibrium level of public good in country c is g p D p( ) = ( )c
N r
c c
r when x p( ) > 0cN r , and it is g p β D p D p( ) = ( ) > ( )c
N r
c c c
r
c c
r
− − − when
x p( ) = 0cN r .
Hence, either
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟β∈ ,
D p
D p β
( )
( ) 2
1r
r
1 1
2 2 1
that is, representatives have suﬃciently homogeneous tax prices and/or β1 and β2 are suﬃciently
small in which case the contributions of both countries are positive, but they partially crowd out each other, or
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟β∉ ,
D p
D p β
( )
( ) 2
1r
r
1 1
2 2 1
that is, representatives have suﬃciently heterogeneous tax prices and/or β1 and β2 are suﬃciently large in which case one country
free rides and the representative of the other country implements his most preferred contribution.
That the nonnegativity constraints x ≥ 01 and x ≥ 02 can bind in the noncooperative policy equilibrium complicates the analysis.
The main point of this section is to investigate how strategic substitutability aﬀect the results of the basic model, and from (14), this
eﬀect is present at the margin only in interior equilibria. Therefore, for the sake of brevity, the analysis below focuses on electoral
equilibria pr such that
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟β∈ ,
D p
D p β
( )
( ) 2
1r
r
1 1
2 2 1
. This is the case for all NEE and CEE when β1 and β2 are suﬃciently small. In the working
paper version (Loeper, 2015), we consider the opposite case of a pure public good that is, β β = 11 2 . In that case, x p( )
N r is always a
corner equilibrium, but the main results are qualitatively unchanged. For convenience, we report these results in Section 7.3.
Proposition 12. For all pr such that
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟β∈ ,
D p
D p β
( )
( ) 2
1r
r
1 1
2 2 1
, if pc
r is a noncooperative electoral best response to p c
r
− , then p =c
r p
β β1 −
c
m
1 2
,
and the corresponding level of public good in country c is
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟g p D( ) =c
r
c
p
β β1 −
c
m
1 2
. Therefore, the unique interior NEE is given by
p =r pβ β1 −
m
1 2
. In this NEE, both public goods are underprovided: there exists a policy vector x that is strictly preferred to xNEE by a
majority of voters in both countries, and any such policy vector yields a higher level of public goods in both countries.
The intuition for Proposition 12 is as follows. Proposition 11 implies that, in contrast to the basic model, the type pc
r elected by
the voters of country c aﬀects not only their own contribution xc but also the contribution of the other country x c− . This electoral
externality is due to the crowding out eﬀect in the policy making stage. It induces voters to delegate policy making to a higher tax
price representative. To understand these electoral incentives, note that Proposition 11 implies that for any interior policy
equilibrium x p( )N r , the level of public good in country c is g D p= ( )c c c
r , so it depends only on the representative of country c. Thus, in
line with the basic model, the electoral stage of the noncooperative regime is strategically equivalent to a game in which the voters of
each country c choose gc, taking g c− as given. However, in contrast to the basic model, because countries' contributions crowd each
other out, an extra unit of public good consumption gc increases that country's contribution xc by more than one unit. Precisely, (14)
implies that the marginal rate of transformation between xc and gc is β β1 − 1 2. The voters react to this crowding out eﬀect by inﬂating
the tax price of their representative by a factor β β1/(1 − )1 2 .
7.2. The cooperative regime
With the speciﬁcation (13), the bargaining program (6) has a unique solution x p( )B r , and the corresponding level of public good is
such that
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟g p x p β x p D
βB B
β β
p( ) = ( ) + ( ) =
1 − /
1 −
,c
B r
c
B r
c c
B r
c
c c c
c
r
− −
−
1 2 (15)
where Bc and B c− are deﬁned as in Section 4.2. By comparing (14) to (15), we see that cooperation requires policy makers to behave
as if their tax price was pβ B Bβ β c
r1 − /
1 −
c c c−
1 2
instead of pc
r. In the Appendix A (see Lemma 7), we show that if we ﬁx the representatives' tax
price, cooperation unambiguously increases the provision of both public goods, relative to the noncooperative policy equilibrium.
Note that the ratio B B/c c− plays the same role as in the basic model. If we take it as an exogenous parameter in the formula (15),
then as B B/c c− increases, the policy vector xB remains Pareto optimal for the two representatives, but xcB increases whereas x cB−
decreases, so the outcome of cooperation becomes less favorable to pc
r and more favorable to p c
r
− .
We now turn to the analysis of the electoral stage. The following proposition shows that, as in the basic model (see Proposition 2),
once voters' incentives are taken into account, whether cooperation increases public good provision depends on whether the
bargaining process treats higher tax price representatives more or less favorably.
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Proposition 13. For all proﬁle of representative pr such that
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟β∈ ,
D p
D p β
( )
( ) 2
1r
r
1 1
2 2 1
, if pc
r is a cooperative electoral best response to p c
r
− ,
then the corresponding level of public good in country c is strictly smaller (greater) than the level of public good in country c in the
noncooperative best response of country c to any p∼ c
r
− if < 0 ( > 0)
B B
p
∂[ / ]
∂
c c
c
r
− .
The intuition for that result is similar to the intuition for Proposition 2 in the basic model. In the cooperative regime, when
choosing the tax price pc
r of their representative, the voters of country c indirectly choose their level of public good consumption gc:
they increase gc as they lower pc
r, as in the noncooperative regime (see Lemma 8 in the Appendix A). However, in contrast to the
noncooperative regime, pc
r also aﬀects the level of public good in the other country g c− . For instance, when B B p∂[ / ]/∂ < 0c c c
r
− , we see
from (15) that g p∂ /∂ > 0c
B
c
r
− . Thus, as the median voter of country c increases her level of public good consumption gc
B (by decreasing
pc
r), she decreases g c
B
− . This means that the crowding out eﬀect of xc
B on x cB− is greater in the cooperative regime than in the
noncooperative regime: an extra unit of public good consumption in country c requires a greater increases in its contribution xc. This
eﬀect of cooperation induces voters to increase public good provision relative to the NEE.
7.3. When does cooperation increase public good provision?
Proposition 14. Suppose that for some c ∈ {1, 2}, D p( )c is more (less) convex than D p p( ) ≡ ln(1/ ) in the sense of Deﬁnition 1.17
Then irrespective of the other parameters of the model, any interior CEE yields more (less) public good in country c than the
interior NEE.
The main ﬁnding in Proposition 14 is that as in the basic model, whether cooperation increases public good provision depends
only on the convexity of the public good demand function. The only diﬀerence is that cooperation increases public good provision in
more cases in this model than in the basic model. To see this, note that any function that is more convex than 1/p is also more convex
than pln(1/ ).
The intuition behind this quantitative diﬀerence between the two models is that in this model, the ineﬃciency of the NEE is
worsened by strategic delegation,18 so it is easier to improve on the NEE. This intuition can be conﬁrmed by considering the pure
public good case, that is, β β = 11 2 . This case is analyzed formally in the working paper version (Loeper, 2015). We show that in the
noncooperative regime, one country always free rides whereas the other country elects its median voter, so strategic delegation does
not exacerbates the coordination failure in the NEE. In that pure public good model, cooperation increases (decreases) public good
provision when D p( )c is more (less) convex than D p p( ) ≡ 1/ 2,19 irrespective of the other parameters of the model. Thus, the main
result of the basic model is still qualitatively unchanged, but cooperation is now less likely to increase public good provision relative
to the basic model, because any function that is more convex than p1/ 2 is also more convex than 1/p.
8. Concluding remarks
It is instructive to relate our results to the empirical literature on the demand for public goods. Most empirical studies have found
a relatively small tax price elasticity of the public good demand, typically lower than one (see, e.g., Wildasin, 1987) but estimates
greater than one have been found for some particular public goods (see DelRossi and Inman (1999)). In light of Corollary 1, these
studies suggest that strategic voting can signiﬁcantly erode the gains from interjurisdictional Coasian cooperation, and that the
impact of cooperation can vary substantially across types of public goods.
It should be noted that most of these estimates are for local public goods. For public goods of national of international scope,
existing estimates are based on individual donations. They are not equivalent to tax price elasticities, because charitable donations
reﬂect a desire for warm glow which is crowded out when individual contributions take the form of mandatory taxation.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that, as for the case of local public goods, these estimates are typically around or below one (see,
e.g., Auten et al., 2002, and the references therein), and more importantly, they vary greatly between public goods (Feldstein, 1975;
Brooks, 2007).
When empirical estimates of tax price elasticities are not available, our results suggest the following rule of thumb: the negative
eﬀect of strategic voting on international cooperation is more severe for public goods whose marginal return decreases more rapidly.
Policy expertise can then be used to assess this rate of decrease for a given public good, say fundamental research, disease
eradication, or global warming.
Acknowledgements
This paper previously circulated under the title “Public Good Provision and Cooperation Among Representative Democracies.”
Support from the Ministerio Economía y Competitividad (Spain), Grants ECO 2013 42710 P, MDM 2014 0431, and Comunidad de
Madrid, MadEco CM (S2015/HUM 3444) is gratefully acknowledged. Part of this research was conducted while I was research
17 The demand function D p p( ) = ln (1/ ) corresponds to the public good technology G x x( ) = − exp(− ), as assumed in Segendorﬀ (1998).
18 Public goods are underprovided in the NEE not only because elected representatives do not internalize externalities, but also because they are less willing to
provide them than the median voters that elected them. Formally, there exists x ∈ +2 such that x is majority preferred in both countries to x p( )N m , and any such
policy vector x is such that x x p> ( )N m1 1 and x x p> ( )N m2 2 . And x p( )N m is in turn majority preferred in both countries to
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟x
NEE pm
β β1 − 1 2
.
19 The demand function D p p( ) = 1/ 2 corresponds to the public good technology G x x( ) = , as assumed in Gradstein (2004).
13
fellow at Banco de Espana. I thank three anonymous referees for their very valuable comments. All remaining errors are mine.
Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1For each c ∈ {1, 2}, the utility functions in (2) and in (13) are linear in pi c, . Therefore, they satisfy the
intermediate preference property of Grandmont (1978). That is, for any voters i j k, , in country c, if j's type is in between that of i and
k i.e., if p p p≤ ≤i c j c k c, , , or p p p≥ ≥i c j c k c, , , then when i and k agree on how to rank two given policies x y, ∈ +
2 , j must also agree
with i and k. This property implies that the majority preferences in country c coincide with the preferences of pc
m (Grandmont, 1978).
A.1. Proofs for Section 4.1
Under our assumptions on Gc, U p x( , )c c
r is strictly concave and diﬀerentiable in xc, strictly decreasing as x → 0c , and strictly
increasing as x → ∞c . Therefore, its unique maximum xcN is characterized by the F.O.C. U x∂ /∂ = 0c c , which implies x p D p( ) = ( )cN r c c
r
and proves (4).
Proof of Proposition 1. From Lemma 1, the noncooperative electoral best response of the voters of country c to some p c
r
− is the
representative's type pc
r most preferred by the median voter of country c, given the policy mapping p x p p→ ( , )c
r N
c
r
c
r
− . So it is the
solution to U p x pmax ( , ( ))p c c
m N r
>0c
r . Substituting x p D p D p( ) = ( ( ), ( ))N r r r1 1 2 2 in this program, we see that the objective function is strictly
quasi concave, and the F.O.C. yields p p=c
r
c
m, irrespective of p c
r
− , which proves the ﬁrst part of Proposition 1.
As argued in Section 4.1, the policy outcome of the NEE xNEE is the outcome of the game in which the median voter of each
country c controls xc, taking x c− as given. In the presence of externalities, it is obvious that the Nash equilibrium of that game is
ineﬃcient, so there exists a policy vector x* that is strictly preferred by both median voters. From Lemma 1, x* is strictly preferred by
a majority of voters in both countries as well. To conclude the proof, it remains to show that any such vector x* must be such that
x D p* > ( )m1 1 1 and x D p* > ( )
m
2 2 2 . Suppose that, say, the latter inequality is violated. Then
U p x U p x D p U p x D p U p D p D p( , *) < ( , *, ( )) ≤ max ( , , ( )) = ( , ( ), ( )),m m m
x
m m m m m
1 1 1 1 1 2 2 ≥0 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 21
so the median voter of country 1 does not strictly prefer x* to xNEE , a contradiction.□
A.2. Proofs for Section 4.2
Lemma 2. Properties (9) and (10) imply that the program (6) has a unique solution, and it is interior.
Proof. We ﬁrst prove that (10) implies that B is strictly quasi concave. For all Δ Δ′, ″ ∈ ++2 , and all α ∈ [0, 1], let
Φ α B αΔ α Δ( ) ≡ ( ′ + (1 − ) ″)1 . Note ﬁrst that B is strictly quasi concave if and only if Φ is strictly quasi concave for all Δ Δ′, ″ ∈ ++2
with Δ Δ′ ≠ ″. Moreover,
⎡
⎣
⎢⎢⎢⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥⎥⎥⎥
Φ
α
Δ Δ B
Δ
αΔ α Δ Δ Δ B
Δ
αΔ α Δ B
Δ
αΔ α Δ
Δ Δ Δ Δ
αΔ α Δ
B
Δ
αΔ α Δ
∂
∂
= ( ′1 − ″1) ∂
∂
( ′ + (1 − ) ″) + ( ′2 − ″2) ∂
∂
( ′ + (1 − ) ″)= ∂
∂
( ′ + (1 − ) ″)
( ′1 − ″1) + ( ′2 − ″2)
( ′ + (1 − ) ″)
∂
∂
( ′ + (1 − ) ″)
.
B
Δ
1 2 1
∂
∂
1
2
If Δ Δ′1 ≥ ″1 and Δ Δ′2 ≥ ″2 with one inequality strict, then the above equation shows that Φ α∂ /∂ has the same strict sign for all
α ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore,Φ is strictly monotonic, and thus strictly quasi concave. The same conclusion applies if Δ Δ′1 ≤ ″1 and Δ Δ′2 ≤ ″2
with one inequality strict. If Δ Δ′1 > ″1 and Δ Δ′2 < ″2, then from (10),
αΔ α Δ
αΔ α Δ
( ′ + (1 − ) ″)
( ′ + (1 − ) ″)
B
Δ
B
Δ
∂
∂ 2
∂
∂ 1
is strictly increasing in α, so the term in bracket
on the R.H.S. of the above expression is strictly decreasing in α, so Φ
α
∂
∂
satisﬁes the strict single crossing condition in α, and Φ is
strictly quasi concave. An analogous reasoning leads to the same conclusion in the remaining case Δ Δ′1 < ″1 and Δ Δ′2 > ″2.
We now prove that (6) has a unique solution. Note thatU p x( , )c c and therefore Δ p x( , )c
r are strictly concave in x. Since B is strictly
quasi concave, x B Δ p x Δ p x→ ( ( , )), ( , ))r r1 2 is strictly quasi concave, so (6) has at most one solution. As x → ∞1 or as x → ∞2 , either
Δ p x( , ) → − ∞r1 or Δ p x( , ) → − ∞r2 , so Property (9) implies that w.l.o.g., we can restrict the choice set of the program (6) to a
bounded and closed subset of +2 , which proves that (6) has at least one solution.
Since Gc xlim ′ ( )=+∞x→0 , one can easily see that any Pareto optimal x ∈ +2 must be such that x > 01 and x > 02 . Since B is strictly
increasing in each coordinate, x p( )B r must be Pareto optimal, and thus interior.
From (4), the welfare gains for representative pc
r from implementing policy x instead of the noncooperative equilibrium x p( )N r is
Δ p x G x β G x p x G D p β G D p p D p( , ) = ( ) + ( ) − − ( ( )) − ( ( )) + ( ).c r c c c c c c
r
c c c c
r
c c c c
r r
c c
r
− − − − − − − (16)
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The following Lemma establishes inter alia Eq. (7).
Lemma 3. If we denote ?
⎛
⎝⎜
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎞
⎠⎟x f p D D( , ) ≡ ,
r p
β f
p
β f1 1 + 2 1 + /
r r
1
1
2
2
, then the equation
?
?
f
B
Δ
Δ p x f p
B
Δ
Δ p x f p
=
∂
∂
( ( , ( , )))
∂
∂
( ( , ( , )))
r r
r r
2
1 (17)
has a unique solution f *, and ?x p x f p( ) = ( *, )B r r .
Proof. From Lemma 2, x p( )B r is the unique interior solution to the program (6), which is characterized by the F.O.C. = 0B Δ p xx
∂[ ( ( , ))]
∂
r
.
Using (16), this F.O.C. becomes
B
Δ
Δ p x G c x p B
Δ
Δ p x βG c x∂
∂
( ( , ))( ′ ( ) − ) + ∂
∂
( ( , )) ′ ( ) = 0.
c
r
c c
r
c
r
c c
− (18)
IsolatingGc x′ ( )c in (18) and using the notation Bc introduced in (8), we obtain Gc x′ ( ) =c
p
β B B1 + /
c
r
c c c−
. Applying the function Dc on both
sides of the latter equation, we obtain (7), which can be rewritten as ?x p x f p( ) = ( , )B r r , where
?
?
f = =B pB p
Δ p x f p
Δ p x f p
( )
( )
( ( , ( , )))
( ( , ( , )))
c
r
c
r
B
Δ
r r
B
Δ
r r
−
∂
∂ 2
∂
∂ 1
, so f is a
solution to (17).
Reciprocally, let f * be a solution to (17), and let ?x x f p* = ( *, )r . Then using successively the deﬁnition of ?x and (17), we obtain
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟BΔ Δ p x G x p
B
Δ
Δ p x β G x B
Δ
Δ p x
p
β f
p B
Δ
Δ p x β
p
β f
B
Δ
Δ p x f B
Δ
Δ p x
∂
∂
( ( , *))( ′1( *) − ) + ∂
∂
( ( , *)) ′1( *) = ∂
∂
( ( , *))
1 + *
− + ∂
∂
( ( , *))
1 + *
= − ∂
∂
( ( , *)) * + ∂
∂
( ( , *)) = 0,
r r r r
r
r r
r
r r
1
1 1
2
1 1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1 2
which shows that x* satisﬁes the F.O.C. (18) for c=1. An analogous reasoning shows that it also satisﬁes (18) for c = 2, so x* is a
solution of (6), and x x p* = ( )B r . Thus, we have shown that the solutions to (17) are in a one to one relationship with the solutions of
the program (6). Since the latter program has a unique solution, so does (17).□
The next lemma shows that in the cooperative regime, the contribution xcB of each country c is strictly decreasing in the type of its
representative pc
r, and thus that as claimed in Section 4.2, by choosing pc
r , the voters of each country eﬀectively chooses their
contribution xc
B (although pc
r also aﬀects the contribution of the other country x cB− , see Lemma 5 below).
Lemma 4. < 0xp
∂ cB
c
r .
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that there exists ?p r such that ?p( ) ≥ 0xp
r∂ cB
c
r . From (7),
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
x
p
D c
p
βB B βB B
βp
βB B
B B
p
∂
∂
= ′
1 + /
× 1
1 + /
−
(1 + / )
∂[ / ]
∂
c
B
c
r
c
r
c c c c c c
c c
r
c c c
c c
c
r
− − −
2
−
Since D′ < 0c and ?p( ) ≥ 0
x
p
r∂ cB
c
r , the above equation implies that
?B B
p
p∂[ / ]
∂
( ) > 0.c c
c
r
r−
(19)
Together with (7), (19) implies that ?p( ) < 0xp
r∂
∂
c
B
c
r
− . Using (7) again and D Gc= ( ′ )c −1, we obtain that for all pcr,
? ? ? ? ? ?U p x p p
p
p
βB B
x
p
β p
β B B
x
p
p x
p
p βB B
βB B
x
p
β p
β B B
x
p
p p x
p
∂[ ( , ( , ))]
∂
=
1 + /
∂
∂
+
1 + /
∂
∂
− ∂
∂
=
− /
1 + /
∂
∂
+
1 + /
∂
∂
+ ( − ) ∂
∂
c c
r B
c
r
c
r
c
r
c
r
c c c
c
B
c
r
c c
r
c c c
c
B
c
r c
r c
B
c
r
c
r
c c c
c c c
c
B
c
r
c c
r
c c c
c
B
c
r c
r
c
r c
B
c
r
−
−
− −
− −
− −
−
− −
− −
−
where the functions in the above expressions are evaluated at ?p p( , )cr cr− . If we set ?p p=cr cr and substitute ?p( ) ≥ 0
x
p
r∂ cB
c
r and ?p( ) < 0xp
r∂
∂
c
B
c
r
−
into the above expression, we obtain that ?? ? p( ) < 0U p x p pp
r∂[ ( , ( , ))]
∂
c c
r B
c
r
c
r
c
r
− . Since ?x p( )B r is Pareto optimal for ?p r , this implies that
?? ? p( ) ≥ 0U p x p pp
r∂[ ( , ( , ))]
∂
c c
r B
c
r
c
r
c
r
− − . Using (4), we always have ?? ? p( ) < 0U p x p pp
r∂[ ( , ( , ))]
∂
c c
r N
c
r
c
r
c
r
− − − . Using notation (5), the latter two inequalities imply
that the gain from cooperation increases for ?p cr− as pcr increases around ?pcr , that is,
?Δ p x p
p
p∂[ ( , ( ))]
∂
( ) > 0.c
r N r
c
r
r−
(20)
Diﬀerentiating (16) and using D Gc= ( ′ )c −1, we obtain
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c c
r
c c c
c
B
c
r c
r c
B
c
r c
B
c c
r c
r
c c c
c c c
c
B
c
r
c c
r
c c c
c
B
c
r
c c
r
c
B
−
− −
− −
− −
−
− −
− −
−
(21)
From (4), D p x( ) <c c
r
c
B. Substituting the latter inequality, ?p( ) ≥ 0xp
r∂ cB
c
r , and ?p( ) < 0xp
r∂
∂
c
B
c
r
− into (21), we obtain that ?p( ) < 0Δ p x pp
r∂[ ( , ( ))]
∂
c
r N r
c
r .
Using property (10), the latter inequality and (20) imply then that B B/c c− must be strictly decreasing in pcr at ?p p=r r , a
contradiction with (19).□
Proof of Proposition 2. Step 1: As p → + ∞c
r , x p( ) → 0cB r and x p D p( ) → ( )cB r c
r
− − .Suppose by contradiction that
x p n plim ( ( ), ) > 0n cB c
r
c
r
→+∞ − for some sequence p n( ) → + ∞c
r . From (7), this implies that as n → ∞, → + ∞B p n pB p p
( ( ), )
( , )
c c
r
c
r
c c
r n
c
r
− −
,
−
, and
therefore, x p n p D p( ( ), ) → ( )cB c
r
c
r
c c
r
− − − − . This implies in turn that Δ p n p x p n p(( ( ), ), ( ( ), )) → − ∞c c
r
c
r B
c
r
c
r
− − , which contradicts property (9),
and thus proves the ﬁrst limit of Step 1. Since x plim ( ) = 0p cN r→+∞cr , the second limit of Step 1 follows then directly from the ﬁrst limit
together with (9) for country c.
Step 2: As p → 0c
r , x p( ) → + ∞cB r , x p o x p( ) = ( ( ))cB r cB r− , and U p x p( , ( )) → − ∞c c
m
c
B r .Using (7) and our assumptions on Gc,
x p D p( ) ≥ ( ) → + ∞cB r c c
r
p →0c
r , which proves the ﬁrst limit of Step 2. To prove the second limit of Step 2, suppose by contradiction
that x p( )cB r− is not o x p( ( ))cB r as p → 0c
r . Then there exists a sequence p → 0c
n such that x p p Ax p p( , ) ≥ ( , )cB c
n
c
r
c
B
c
n
c
r
− − − for some A > 0.
Therefore, x p p( , ) → + ∞cB c
n
c
r
− − . Since Gc xlim ′ ( ) = 0x→+∞ , this implies that as p → 0c
r , Gc x p p o x p p′ ( ( , )) = ( ( , ))cB c
n
c
r
c
B
c
n
c
r
− − − and
G c x p p o x p′ − ( ( , )) = ( ( ))cB c
n
c
r
c
B r
− − − , so from (2),U p x p p( , ( , )) → − ∞c c
r B
c
n
c
r
− − − , and therefore, Δ p x p p( , ( , )) → − ∞c
r B
c
n
c
r
− − , which contradicts
property (9).
To prove the third limit, note that since Gc xlim ′ ( ) = 0x c→+∞c , the ﬁrst limit of Step 2 implies that as p → 0c
r ,G x p o x p( ( )) = ( ( ))c cB r cB r .
Since G c xlim ′ − ( ) = 0x c→+∞ −c− , the second limit implies that as p → 0c
r , G x p o x p o x p( ( )) = ( ( )) = ( ( ))c cB r cB r cB r− − − . Therefore,
U p x plim ( , ( )) = − ∞p c c
m
c
B r
→0c .
Step 3: a cooperative electoral best response exists.
From Deﬁnition 3 and Lemma 1, the cooperative electoral best response of the voters of country c to some p c
r
− are the solutions of
U p x pmax ( , ( )).
p c c
m
c
B r
>0c
r (22)
The last limit in Step 2 implies that w.l.o.g., we can restrict the choice set of the program (22) to b[ , + ∞) for some b > 0. From Step
1, x p D plim ( ) = (0, ( ))p B r c c
r
→+∞ − −c , and from (7), for all ﬁnite pc, x p( ) > 0c
B r and x p D p( ) > ( )cB r c c
r
− − − . Note that p x( , ) > 0
U
x c
m∂
∂
c
c−
and for xc
suﬃciently small, p x( , ) > 0Ux c
m∂
∂
c
c
, so w.l.o.g., we can further restrict the choice set of the program (22) to b b[ , ] for some b b> . Since
U p x p( , ( ))m B r1 1 is continuous, (22) has a solution.
Step 4: if pc
r is a cooperative electoral best response to p c
r
− , and if p∼c
r is a noncooperative electoral best response to some p∼ c
r
− ,
then x p x p( ) − ( )∼cB r cN r has the same sign as B B p∂[ / ]/∂c c c
r
− .
Any solution to (22) must satisfy the F.O.C. U p x p p∂[ ( , ( ))]/∂ = 0c c
m
c
B r
c
r . Using (7) and D Gc= ( ′ )c −1, we obtain
U p x p
p
p
β B p
B p
x
p
β p
β
x
p
p x
p
∂[ ( , ( ))]
∂
=
1 + ( )
( )
∂
∂
+
1 +
∂
∂
− ∂
∂
.c c
m
c
B r
c
r
c
r
c
c
r
c
r
c
B
c
r
c c
r
c
B p
B p
c
B
c
r c
m c
B
c
r
−
− −
−
( )
( )
−
c
r
c
r
− (23)
Suppose pc
r is a cooperative electoral best response to p c
r
− . Substituting the F.O.C. into the above equation and rearranging terms, we
obtain
p
β
p
β p
β
B p p
B p p
x
p
p p
x
p
p p1 +
= −
1 +
( , )
( , )
∂
∂
( , )
∂
∂
( , )
,c
r
c
B p p
B p p
c
m c c
r
c
c c
r
c
r
c c
r
c
r
c
B
c
r c
r
c
r
c
B
c
r c
r
c
r
( , )
( , )
− −
−
−
− −
−
−
−
c c
r
c
r
c c
r
c
r
− −
−
(24)
where the division by x p∂ /∂cB c
r is valid since from Lemma 4, x p∂ /∂ > 0cB c
r . Substituting (24) into (7), we obtain
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟
x p D p
β p
β B p
B p
x
p
p
x
p
p
( ) = −
1 + ( )
( )
∂
∂
( )
∂
∂
( )
.cB r c c
m c c
r
c
c
r
c
r
c
B
c
r
r
c
B
c
r
r
− −
−
−
−
From Proposition 1, irrespective of p∼ c
r
− , x p D p( ) = ( )∼c
N r
c c
m . The two latter equations imply that x p x p( ) − ( )∼cB r cN r has the same sign as
p p( )/ ( )xp
r x
p
r∂
∂
∂
∂
c
B
c
r
c
B
c
r
− , which from Lemma 4 has the opposite sign of p( )xp
r∂
∂
c
B
c
r
− , which from (7), has the opposite sign of B B
p
∂[ / ]
∂
c c
c
r
− , as needed.
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A.3. Proofs for Section 4.3
The next lemma shows that the curvature of Dc determines how the representative's type aﬀects B B/c c− .
Lemma 5. Let ϕc be such that for all p > 0c
r , D p ϕ p( ) = (1/ )c c
r
c c
r . If ϕc is strictly convex (concave), then B B p∂[ / ]/∂ > 0c c c
r
− (<0).
Proof. We prove the Lemma for c = 1, the proof for c=2 is analogous. From Lemma 3, B B/2 1 is given by the solution f to the ﬁxed
point condition (17) for c=1. Therefore, it suﬃces to show that if ϕ1 is strictly convex (concave), then f p∂ /∂ > 0r1 (<0).
Diﬀerentiating (17) w.r.t. p r1 , , we obtain
?
? ?
?
?
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
f
p
B
Δ
Δ p x f p
p
B
Δ
Δ p x f p B
Δ
Δ p x f p
B
Δ
Δ p x f p
p
B
Δ
Δ p x f p
∂
∂
=
∂ ∂
∂
( ( , ( , )))
∂
∂
∂
( ( , ( , ))) − ∂
∂
( ( , ( , )))
∂ ∂
∂
( ( , ( , )))
∂
∂
∂
( ( , ( , )))
.r
r r
r
r r r r
r r
r
r r1
2
1 1 2
1
1
1
2
By deﬁnition of ?x (see Lemma 3) ?x p∂ /∂ = 0r2 1 , so the above equation can be expanded as follows
? ? ?
? ? ?
? ? ?
? ? ?
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
B
Δ
f
p
B
Δ
B
Δ Δ
Δ
p
Δ
x
x
p
Δ
x
x
f
f
p
Δ
x
x
f
f
p
B
Δ
B
Δ
Δ
p
Δ
x
x
p
Δ
x
x
f
f
p
Δ
x
x
f
f
p
B
Δ
B
Δ
Δ
p
Δ
x
x
p
Δ
x
x
f
f
p
Δ
x
x
f
f
p
B
Δ
B
Δ Δ
Δ
p
Δ
x
x
p
Δ
x
x
f
f
p
Δ
x
x
f
f
p
∂
∂
∂
∂
= ∂
∂
∂
∂ ∂
∂
∂
+ ∂
∂
∂
∂
+ ∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
+ ∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
+ ∂
∂
∂
(∂ )
∂
∂
+ ∂
∂
∂
∂
+ ∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
+ ∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
− ∂
∂
∂
(∂ )
∂
∂
+ ∂
∂
∂
∂
+ ∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
+ ∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
− ∂
∂
∂
∂ ∂
∂
∂
+ ∂
∂
∂
∂
+ ∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
+ ∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
,
r r r r r
r r r r
r r r r
r r r r
1
2
1 1
2
1 2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
2
2
2
2
1
2
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
2
2
2
1
2
2
1
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1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
2
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1 2
2
1
2
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
2
2
2
1
where the derivatives of B in the above equation are all evaluated at ?Δ Δ p x f p= ( , ( , ))r r . Solving for f p∂ /∂ r1 , we obtain
?
?
? ?
? ?
⎛
⎝⎜⎜
⎞
⎠⎟⎟
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
⎛
⎝⎜⎜
⎞
⎠⎟⎟
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎛
⎝⎜⎜
⎞
⎠⎟⎟
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
f
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Δ
B
Δ Δ
B
Δ
B
Δ
Δ
p
Δ
x
x
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Δ
B
Δ Δ
B
Δ
B
Δ
Δ
p
Δ
x
x
p
B
Δ
B
Δ
B
Δ Δ
B
Δ
Δ
x
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Δ
x
x
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Δ
B
Δ Δ
B
Δ
B
Δ
Δ
x
x
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Δ
x
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∂
∂
=
∂
∂
∂
∂ ∂
− ∂
∂
∂
(∂ )
∂
∂
+ ∂
∂
∂
∂
− ∂
∂
∂
∂ ∂
− ∂
∂
∂
(∂ )
∂
∂
+ ∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
− ∂
∂
∂
∂ ∂
− ∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
+ ∂
∂
∂
∂
+ ∂
∂
∂
∂ ∂
− ∂
∂
∂
(∂ )
∂
∂
∂
∂
+ ∂
∂
∂
∂
.r
r r
r r
B
Δ
1
1
2
1 2 2
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
1 2 1
2
2
2
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
1 2 2
∂
(∂ )
1
1
1 1
2
2
2
2
1 2 1
2
2
2
2
1
1 2
2
2
2
1
2
(25)
Since D c′ < 0, by deﬁnition of ?x (see Lemma 3), we have ? > 0xf
∂
∂
1 and
? < 0xf
∂
∂
2 . Moreover, ? ?p x G x p p( , ) = ′( ) − = − < 0Δx
r r p
β f
r∂
∂ 1 1 1 1 1 + 1
r
1
1
1
1
,
and ? ?p x G x( , ) = ′( ) > 0Δx
r∂
∂ 1 1 1
1
2
. Therefore, the term ? ?+Δx
x
f
Δ
x
x
f
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
1
1
1 1
2
2 in the denominator of the R.H.S. of (25) is negative. An analogous
reasoning implies that
? ?+Δx
x
f
Δ
x
x
f
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
2
1
1 2
2
2 is positive. Using property (10), we have
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥ ⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
B
Δ
B
Δ Δ
B
Δ
B
Δ Δ
B
Δ
∂
∂
∂
∂ ∂
− ∂
∂
∂
(∂ )
=
∂ /
∂
∂
∂
> 0,
B
Δ
B
Δ
2
2
1 2 1
2
2
2
∂
∂
∂
∂
2 2
2
1 2
and the same inequality hold if we reverse the role of 1 and 2. Therefore, the denominator of the R.H.S. of (25) is strictly positive, so
f
p
∂
∂ r1
has the same sign as its numerator. Thus, we have shown that f
p
∂
∂ r1
is positive (negative) if
?+Δp
Δ
x
x
p
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂r r
1
1
1
1
1
1
and
?⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟− +
Δ
p
Δ
x
x
p
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂r r
2
1
2
1
1
1
are
both positive (negative). Therefore, to conclude the proof, it suﬃces to show that
?+Δp
Δ
x
x
p
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂r r
1
1
1
1
1
1
and
?⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟− +
Δ
p
Δ
x
x
p
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂r r
2
1
2
1
1
1
are positive
(negative) when ϕ1 is strictly convex (concave).
By deﬁnition of ϕ1, for all p > 01 , ϕ p p D p′ (1/ ) = − ( )
′1( )1 1 1
2
1 . Using the latter identity, (16) and the deﬁnition of ?x (see Lemma 3), we
obtain
? ? ⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
Δ
p
Δ
x
x
p
β D p p
β G x
β f
D
p
β f
β
p
ϕ
p
ϕ
β f
p
∂
∂
+ ∂
∂
∂
∂
= − ′1( ) +
′1( )
1 +
′1
1 +
= ′1 1 − ′1
1 +
,r r
r r
r
r r r
2
1
2
1
1
1
1 1 1
1 1
1
1
1
1
1 1
1
1 (26)
and
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? ? ?
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
Δ
p
Δ
x
x
p
x p D p D p p D p
G x p
β f
D
p
β f
ϕ
β f
p
ϕ
p
β f
p
ϕ
β f
p
∂
∂
+ ∂
∂
∂
∂
= − − ′1( ) + ( ) + ′1( ) +
′( ) −
1 +
′1
1 +
= −
1 +
+ 1 + ′1
1 +
.
r r
r r r r r
r r
r r r r
1
1
1
1
1
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1 (27)
The intermediate value theorem implies that there exists
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟p p∈ ,
p
β f
r
1 + 1
r
1
1
such that
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ϕ ϕ ϕ− = ′
β f
p p
β f
p p1
1 +
1
1
1
1
r r r
1
1 1
1
1
. Substituting the
latter identity into (27), we obtain
? ⎡
⎣
⎢⎢
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎤
⎦
⎥⎥
Δ
p
Δ
x
x
p
β f
p
ϕ
β f
p
ϕ
p
∂
∂
+ ∂
∂
∂
∂
= ′1
1 +
− ′1 1r r r r
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1 (28)
Since < <p p
β f
p
1 1 1 +
r r
1
1
1
, (26) and (28) are both positive (negative) when ϕ′1 is strictly increasing (decreasing), as needed.
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Proposition 3 follows readily from the following proposition, and Deﬁnitions 2 and 3.□
Proposition 15. Let p ∈ (0, + ∞)r 2 and p ∈ (0, + ∞)∼r 2 be two proﬁles of representatives such that pcr is a cooperative electoral
best response of the voters of country c to p c
r
− , and p∼c
r is a noncooperative electoral best response to p∼ c
r
− . If Dc is more (less) convex
than the unit elastic demand, then x p( )cB r is greater (smaller) than x p( )∼cN r .
Proof. From Proposition 2, a cooperative electoral best response pc
r to some p c
r
− yields more (less) public good in country c than the
noncooperative electoral best response p∼c
r to some p∼ c
r
− if
B B
p
∂[ / ]
∂
c c
c
r
− evaluated at pr is positive (negative). Using Lemma 5, this is the case
when ϕc is strictly convex (concave). The conclusion follows from Deﬁnition 1.
Proof of Corollary 1. In the isoelastic case, D p p( ) =c ε− c so ϕ p p( ) =c
εc, and ϕc is strictly convex (concave) when ε ε> 1 ( < 1)c c . The
corollary follows then readily from Proposition 15.
A.4. Proofs for Section 4.4
Proposition 4 is a direct corollary of the following proposition, and of Deﬁnitions 2 and 3.
Proposition 16. Suppose that for some c ∈ {1, 2}, Dc is less convex than the unit elastic demand, and let p ∈ (0, + ∞)r 2 be such
that pc
r is a cooperative electoral best response of the voters of country c to p c
r
− . Then the corresponding outcome x p( )
B r makes a
majority of voters in country c strictly worse oﬀ relative to the outcome of the NEE x p( )N NEE .
Proof. Under the condition of the proposition, Proposition 15 implies that x p x p( ) < ( )cB r cN NEE . To complete the proof, in what
follows, we show that for all y ∈ +2 , if y x p< ( )c c
N NEE , then a majority of voters in country c strictly prefer x p( )N NEE to y.
Since y x p< ( )c c
N NEE , the median voter in country c− strictly prefers x p( )N NEE to y x p( , ( ))c c
N NEE
− . Note that x U p y x→ ( , , )c c c
m
c c− − − − is
maximized at x D p x p= ( ) = ( )c c c
m
c
N NEE
− − − − . Therefore, the median voter in country c strictly prefers y x p( , ( ))c c
N NEE
− to y. By transitivity,
she strictly prefers x p( )N NEE to y. The proposition follows then from Lemma 1.□
Proof of Proposition 5. Suppose ﬁrst that p p≤c
CEE
c
m for some country c. Since p c
CEE
− is a best response to pc
CEE , the median voter in
country c prefers x p( )B CEE to x p p( , )B c
CEE
c
m
− , and from condition 9, she also prefers x p p( , )
B
c
CEE
c
m
− to x p p D p D p( , ) = ( ( ), ( ))
N
c
CEE
c
m
c c
CEE
c c
m
− − − .
Since p p≤c
CEE
c
m, we have D p D p( ) ≥ ( )c c
CEE
c c
m , so she also prefers D p D p( ( ), ( ))c c
CEE
c c
m
− − to x p D p D p( ) = ( ( ), ( ))
N NEE
c c
m
c c
m
− − . By transitivity, she
strictly prefers x p( )B CEE to x p( )N NEE . Proposition 5 follows then from Lemma 1.
Suppose now that p p>CEE m1 1 and p p>
CEE m
2 2 . Since D1 are D2 are less convex than a unit elastic demand, Proposition 3 implies
then that for all c ∈ {1, 2},
x p x p x p( ) > ( ) > ( ).cB m cB CEE cN m (29)
For all α ∈ [0, 1], let x α α x p αx p( ) ≡ (1 − ) ( ) + ( )cB m cN m . From (29), for all c ∈ {1, 2} and α ∈ [0, 1],
x x p x α x p x(0) = ( ) ≥ ( ) ≥ ( ) = (1)c cB m c cN m c
From (29), and by continuity of α x α→ ( ), there exists α ∈ (0, 1) such that for all α α∈ [0, ) and all c ∈ {1, 2}, x α x p( ) > ( )c cB CEE , and
for some d ∈ {1, 2}, x α x p( ) = ( )d dB CEE . By construction of α , x α x p x p( ) ≥ ( ) ≥ ( )d dB CEE dN m− − − . Note that x U p x x→ ( , , )d d d
m
d d− − − − is concave
with a maximum at x x p D p= ( ) = ( )d dN d
m
d d
m
− − − − − . Therefore, the previous inequality implies that the median voter of country d− prefers
x p( )B CEE to x p x α x α( ( ), ( )) = ( )dB CEE d− . Moreover, from Property (9), U p x U p x( , (0)) > ( , (1))d d
m
d d
m
− − − − . Since U p x α( , ( ))d d
m
− − is strictly
concave in α, the last inequality imply that she strictly prefers x α( ) to x x p(1) = ( )N m . By transitivity, she strictly prefers x p( )B CEE to
20 To see the parallel with the sketch of the proof at the end of Section 4.3, note that the terms
?+Δp r
Δ
x
x
p r
∂ 1
∂ 1
∂ 1
∂ 1
∂ 1
∂ 1
and
?+Δp r
Δ
x
x
p r
∂ 2
∂ 1
∂ 2
∂ 1
∂ 1
∂ 1
correspond to the eﬀect of p r1 on
?Δ p x f p( , ( , ))r r1 and ?Δ p x f p( , ( , ))r r2 , that is, on the gains from cooperation for representatives 1 and 2, respectively. As explained in the sketch of the proof, these eﬀects
determine the eﬀect of p r1 on B1 and B2, respectively, and thus on the terms of cooperation B B/2 1. Note that the above terms diﬀerentiate ?Δ p x f p( , ( , ))r r w.r.t. p r1
keeping f ﬁxed. So in the language of the sketch of the proof, we take the “as if” subsidies τ1 and τ2 ﬁxed. Taking τ1 and τ2 ﬁxed does not aﬀect the sign of the eﬀect of
p r1 on B B/2 1 because we have shown that the denominator of the R.H.S. of (25), which collects all the indirect eﬀects of p
r
1 on τ1 and τ2, is always strictly positive.
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x p( )N m . The proposition follows then from Lemma 1.□
Proof of Proposition 6. If Dc is unit elastic and D c− is more convex than Dc, then we know from Proposition 3 that in any CEE
pCEE, x p x p( ) = ( )cB CEE cN NEE and x p x p( ) > ( )cB CEE cN NEE− − . Since G ′ > 0c− , this implies that the median voter in country c is strictly better
oﬀ in the CEE than in the NEE. Since U p x x( , , )c c
m
c c− − − is concave in x c− with a maximum at x D p x p= ( ) = ( )c c c
m
c
N NEE
− − − − , the median
voter of country c is strictly worse oﬀ in the CEE than in the NEE.
A.5. Proofs for Section 4.5
Proof of Proposition 7. The cooperative electoral best response of each country c is given by the solution of U p x pmax ( , ( ))p c c
m B r
>0c
r .
Observe that if we can prove that this program has a unique maximum, then existence of a CEE follows then from Brower's ﬁxed
point theorem, since from the maximum theorem, the continuity of p U p x p→ ( , ( ))c
r
c c
m B r implies the continuity of its unique
maximum. To prove uniqueness of the cooperative electoral best response, it suﬃces to show that p U p x p→ ( , ( ))c
r
c c
m B r is strictly
quasi concave.
For the isoelastic speciﬁcation, for all ε > 0 such that ε ≠ 1,
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟⎟⎟
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟⎟⎟
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟⎟⎟
U p x p ε
ε
p
β B p
B p
β ε
ε
p
β B p
B p
p
p
β B p
B p
( , ( )) =
− 1 1 + ( )
( )
+
− 1 1 + ( )
( )
−
1 + ( )
( )
.c c
m
c
B r c
r
c
c
r
c
r
ε
c
c
r
c
c
r
c
r
ε
m
r c
r
c
c
r
c
r
ε
−
1−
−
−
−
−
1−
−
−
From Lemma 3, the fraction B p
B p
( )
( )
r
r
2
1
in the above formula is the is the solution f to (17), which, in the case of the generalized Nash
bargaining function,21 yields
?
?f
π Δ p x f p
π Δ p x f p
= ( , ( , ))
( , ( , ))
,
r r
r r
2 1
1 2 (30)
where
?
?
⎧
⎨
⎪⎪⎪
⎩
⎪⎪⎪
⎡
⎣
⎢⎢
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎤
⎦
⎥⎥
⎡
⎣
⎢⎢
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎤
⎦
⎥⎥
ε Δ p x f p β f ε β f p εβ p
ε Δ p x f p ε p εβ β f p
( − 1) ( , ( , )) = [(1 + ) (1 + (1 − ) ) − 1]( ) + 1 + − 1 ( )
( − 1) ( , ( , )) = 1 + 1 + (1 − ) − 1 ( ) + [(1 + ) − 1]( )
.
r r ε r ε β
f
ε
r ε
r r β
f
ε
β
f
r ε ε r ε
1 1
−1
1 1
1−
2
−1
2
1−
2
−1
2
1−
1 1
−1
1
1−
2
2 2
(31)
Case ε = 1 (i.e., G x x( ) = ln( ) and D p p( ) = 1/ ).
When ε = 1, pD p ε p( ) ( ) is constant, so from Lemma 5, B p
B p
( )
( )
c
r
c
r
− and x p( )cB r are independent of p c
r
− . Therefore, the induced utility
function of the median voter can be written as
U p x p G x p β G x p p x p( , ( )) = ( ( )) + ( ( )) − ( ).c c
m B r
c c
B
c
r
c c c
B
c
r
c
m
c
B
c
r
− − − −
From Lemma 4, x p( )cB c
r is strictly monotonic in pc
r , and since x G x p x→ ( ) −c c c c
m
c is strictly concave, U p x p( , ( ))c c
m B r is strictly quasi
concave in pc
r, as needed.
Case ε = 2 (i.e., G x x( ) = 2 and D p p( ) = 1/ 2).
From (31), when ε = 2,
?
?
⎧
⎨
⎪⎪
⎩
⎪⎪
Δ p x f p
β f
p
β
fp
Δ p x f p
β
f p
β f
p
( , ( , )) = − + 2
( , ( , )) = − + 2
,
r r
r r
1
1
2 2
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
1
and simple algebra shows that the solution to (30) is
?
?f =
π β p
π β p
2 2
2/3
1
1/3
1 1
2/3
2
1/3 , where ?π π π= (2 + )c c c− 1/3. Substituting the latter expression for f
into ?x f p( , )r , we obtain
?
?
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟⎟x p D( ) =c
B
c
p
1 +
c
π cβc β c pc
πcp c
− 1/3 −
2/3 1/3
−
1/3
. Substituting G x x( ) = 2 , D p p( ) = 1/ 2, and the latter expression for x p( )B into
U p x p( , ( ))m B1 1 , we obtain
21 Note that for this proof, we use the Nash bargainign function B. So this particular result may not be true for other bargaining functions.
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?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
U p x p
π β β p
π p
p
β
π β β p
π p
p
p
π β β p
π p
p
p
π β β
π p p
β
p
π β β
π p p
p
p
π β β
π p p
π β β
π p p
( , ( )) = 2
1 +
+ 2
1 +
−
1 +
= 2 +
2
+
2
+
2
− 1 +
2
+ .
m B m
m
1 1
2 1
1/3
2
2/3
1
1/3
1 2
1/3
1
2
1 2
1/3
1
2/3
2
1/3
2 1
1/3
2
1
2 1
1/3
2
2/3
1
1/3
1 2
1/3
1
2
1
2 1
1/3
2
2/3
1 2
1/3
1
2/3
2
2
1 2
4/3
1
2/3
2 1
1/3
2
2/3 1
1
2
2 1
1/3
2
2/3
1 2
1/3
1
5/3
2
2
1
2/3
2
4/3
1
2
2
2/3
1
4/3
Diﬀerentiating w.r.t. p1, we get
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
⎡
⎣
⎢⎢
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
⎤
⎦
⎥⎥
U p x p
p p
π β β
π p p
π β β
π p p
p
p
π β β
π p p
π β β
π p p
p
π β β p
π p
π β β p
π p
p
p
π β β
π p p
π β β
π p p
∂[ ( , ( ))]
∂
= − 2 −
4
3
−
2
3
+ 2 +
10
3
+
4
3
= 1 −2 −
4
3
−
2
3
+ 2 +
10
3
+
4
3
.
m B
m
m
1 1
1 1
2
2 1
1/3
2
2/3
1 2
1/3
1
5/3
1 2
4/3
1
2/3
2 1
4/3
2
2/3 1
1
3
2 1
1/3
2
2/3
1 2
1/3
1
8/3
2
2
1
2/3
2
4/3
1
2
2
2/3
1
7/3
1
2
2 1
1/3
2
2/3
1
1/3
1 2
1/3
1 2
4/3
1
2/3
1
2/3
2 2
2/3 1
1
2 1
1/3
2
2/3
1 2
1/3
1
2/3
2
2
1
2/3
2
4/3
1
2
2
2/3
1
1/3
Each of the terms inside the bracket on the R.H.S. of the above equation is decreasing, some of them strictly decreasing, which
proves that U p x p( , ( ))m B r1 1 is strictly quasi concave in p
r
1 , as needed. The proof for country 2 is analogous.
Case ε → ∞.
In what follows, we will show that for all a b, > 0 such that a b< , if we restrict voters in the electoral stage of the cooperative
regime to elect a representative with a type in a b[ , ], then for ε suﬃciently large, such a restricted CEE exists, and it must tend to
p p=CEE m as ε → ∞. Since we can choose a arbitrarily small and b arbitrarily large, this property implies the existence of an
unrestricted CEE for ε suﬃciently large, because as ε → ∞, Dc becomes inﬁnitely elastic, so given a strategy proﬁle pr close to pm,
electing type pc
r smaller than a or greater than b is not a proﬁtable deviation for the median voter of country c. To prove existence of
a restricted CEE, it suﬃces to show that for all a b, > 0 such that a b< , for ε suﬃciently large, for all p a b∈ [ , ]c
r
− , p U p x p→ ( , ( ))c
r
c c
m B r
is strictly quasi concave on a b[ , ]. As shown in the proof of Proposition 2,
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟
U p x p
p
x
p
p
β f p
β p
β f p
x
p
x
p
p
∂[ ( , ( ))]
∂
= ∂
∂ 1 + ( )
+
1 + / ( )
∂
∂
∂
∂
− ,
m B r
r
B
r
r
r
r
r
B
r
B
r
m1 1 1
1
1
1
1
1
2 2
2
2
1
1
1
1
(32)
and from Lemma 4, < 0xp
∂
∂
B
r
1
1
. So to prove the desired property, it suﬃces to show that for ε suﬃciently large, for all p a b∈ [ , ]r2 , the
term in parenthesis on the R.H.S. of (32) is strictly increasing in p r1 on a b[ , ].
From (31), for all p ∈r ++2 and f ∈ ++, as ε → ∞,
?
?
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟⎟⎟
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜
⎧
⎨
⎪⎪
⎩
⎪⎪
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
⎛
⎝
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⎞
⎠
⎟⎟⎟⎟
⎫
⎬
⎪⎪
⎭
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⎠
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⎞
⎠
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⎛
⎝
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⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
⎛
⎝
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⎧
⎨
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⎩
⎪⎪
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
⎛
⎝
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⎞
⎠
⎟⎟⎟⎟
⎫
⎬
⎪⎪
⎭
⎪⎪
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟
Δ p x f p
Δ p x f p
β f
p
β f
β
p
β
f
o
p
β f
p
β
f
β
f
p
β
f
β
p
β f
o
p
β f
p
β
f
β fR ε p f β o R ε p f
β
f
β R ε p f o R ε p f
( , ( , ))
( , ( , ))
=
−
1 +
+
1 +
+ max
1 +
,
1 +
−
1 +
+
1 +
+ max
1 +
,
1 +
=
− ( , , ) + + (max{ ( , , ), 1})
− + ( , , ) + (max{ ( , , ), 1})
,
r r
r r
r ε r
ε
r ε r
ε
r
ε
r ε r ε r
ε
r r
r r
1
2
1
1
1
1−
2
2
2
1−
1
1
1−
2
2
1−
2 2
2
1−
1
1
1
1−
1
1
1−
2
2
1−
1 2
2
1 (33)
where
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟R ε p f( , , ) ≡r
p
β f p
ε
1 +
1 +
1−
r
β
f
r
1
1
2
2
. Let f ε p( , )r denote the solution to (30). We now show that as ε → + ∞, pβ f ε p
β f ε p
p1 + ( , )
1 + / ( , )r
r
r
r
1
1
2
2
tends
to 1 uniformly over all pr . Suppose by contradiction that this is false. Then there exists a sequence pn and ε → ∞n such that
p
β f ε p
β f ε p
p1 + ( , )
1 + / ( , )n
n n
n n
n
1
1
2
2
tends to some limit l ∈ [0, + ∞] with l ≠ 1. Suppose to ﬁx ideas that l < 1, the proof in the case l > 1 is
analogous. In that case, by deﬁnition of R, R ε p f ε p( , , ( , )) → + ∞n n n n , so from (33), ?? f ε p→ − lim ( , ) < 0
Δ p x f ε p p
Δ p x f ε p p
n n( , ( ( , ), ))
( , ( ( , ), ))
n n n n
n n n n
1
2
, which
contradicts (30). Therefore, as ε → ∞, the solution f ε p( , )r to (30) tends uniformly to a limit f p( )r∞ which is the unique positive
solution to
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p
β f p
p
β
f p
1 + ( )
=
1 +
( )
.
r
r
r
r
1
1
∞
2
2
∞ (34)
As shown above, R ε p f ε p( , , ( , ))r r must remain bounded as ε → ∞. From (33), it must tend to some R p( )r∞ uniformly over all pr ,
where from (30), R p( )r∞ is given by
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
f p
π β f p R p β
π
β
f p
β R p
R p
β
β f p
( ) =
(− ( ) ( ) + )
−
( )
+ ( )
⇒ ( ) =
( )
.r
r r
r
r
r
r
∞ 2 1
∞ ∞
2
1
2
∞ 1
∞
∞ 2
1
∞
(35)
Moreover, by diﬀerentiating (30) w.r.t. p r1 and then letting ε → ∞, we obtain that
f ε p
p
∂ ( , )
∂
r
r
1
converges uniformly over all pr in the
compact interval a b[ , ]2. Therefore, f ε p
p
∂ ( , )
∂
r
r
1
must converge to f p
p
∂ ( )
∂
r
r
∞
1
as ε → ∞ (see, e.g., Rudin, 1976, Theorem 7.17). Diﬀerentiating
(34), we obtain that
⎡
⎣
⎢⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥⎥
⎡
⎣
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⎦
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p
β f p
p
∂
1 + ( )
∂
=
∂
1 + / ( )
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r
r
r
r
r
1
1
∞
1
2
2
∞
1 (36)
Using (7), (34), and (36), we obtain
⎛
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1
1
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1
1
− −1
2
2
1
1
1
1
→∞ ∞
1
∞
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so as ε → ∞, the term in parenthesis on the R.H.S. of (32) tends towards
p
β f p
β p
β f p R p
p p p
1 + ( )
+
1 + / ( )
1
( )
− = − .
r
r
r
r r
m r m1
1
∞
2 2
2
∞ ∞ 1 1 1
(37)
The derivative of (37) w.r.t p r1 is 1. By continuity, the derivative of the term in parenthesis on the R.H.S. of (32) converges uniformly
over all pr in the compact interval a b[ , ]2, so it must converge uniformly to 1 (see, e.g., Rudin, 1976, Theorem 7.17). Thus, we have
shown that for all bounded interval a b[ , ], for ε suﬃciently large, for all p a b∈ [ , ]r2 ,U p x p( , ( ))
m B r
1 1 1 is strictly quasi concave in p
r
1 on
a b[ , ]. Moreover, we see from (37) that for all a b[ , ], the electoral best response of the voters of country 1 to any p r2 must tend to p
m
1 as
ε → ∞, as needed.
Case β β( , ) → (0, 0)1 2 .
Clearly, as β → (0, 0), for the median voter of country c, electing an arbitrarily small or large type is not a proﬁtable deviation
from a strategy proﬁle pr close enough to pm. Therefore, as argued in the case ε → ∞, to prove the existence of a CEE, it suﬃces to
show that for all compact intervals a b[ , ], for β suﬃciently small, for all p a b∈ [ , ]r2 , the term in parenthesis on the R.H.S. of (32) is
strictly increasing in p r1 on a b[ , ], and that its root tends to p
m
1 as β → (0, 0).
Note that as β β( , ) → (0, 0)1 2 ,
x
p
∂
∂
B
r
2
1
tends to 0, so the term in parenthesis on the R.H.S. of (32) tends towards p p−r c
m
1 , whose
derivative w.r.t. p r1 is 1. The same continuity argument as in the proof of the case ε → ∞ implies then that as β β( , ) → (0, 0)1 2 , the
derivative of the term in parenthesis on the R.H.S. of (32) must tend to 1 uniformly over all p a b∈ [ , ]r , which shows that for all
bounded interval a b[ , ], for β suﬃciently small, for all p a b∈ [ , ]r2 , p U p x p→ ( , ( ))
r m B r
1 1 1 1 is strictly quasi concave on a b[ , ], as needed.□
A.6. Proofs in Section 5
Proof of Proposition 8. With utilitarian bargaining, B π=c c, so from (7), the outcome of the policy making stage of the
cooperative regime is then
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟x p D( ) =c
B r
c
p
β π π1 + /
c
r
c c c−
. Thus, the contribution of country c depends only on pc
r, and the electoral stage of
the cooperative regime is strategically equivalent to the game in which the voters of each country c control their own policy xc
B,
taking the policy of the other country x cB− as given. It is therefore strategically equivalent to the electoral stage of the noncooperative
regime (see Section 4.1).□
A.7. Proofs in Section 6
The program that determines x p( )B r and the transfer t p( )B r is
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π Δ p x p t π Δ p x αp tmax [ ln( ( , ) + ) + ln( ( , ) − )]
x x t
r r r r
≥0, ≥0, 1 1 1 2 2 21 2
where π π+ = 11 2 and for all c ∈ {1, 2},
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The F.O.C. of this program are
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Substituting the third condition into the ﬁrst two, we obtain G x′1( ) = αp pαp β p1 +
r r
r r
1 2
2 1 1
and G x′2( ) = p pp αβ p2 +
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which proves (11). The welfare of the median voter of country 1 for a given proﬁle of representative pr is then
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Diﬀerentiating w.r.t. p r1 , using
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and regrouping the terms in factor of D p′1( )r1 ,
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The F.O.C. of the electoral best response of country 1 is = 0V p x p t pp
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. Using the above equation, this F.O.C. implies
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Proof of Proposition 9. Suppose D D D= =1 2 , β β= = 11 2 , α = 1, π π= = 1/21 2 , and p p p= =
m m m
1 2 , and let p p( , )
r r be a symmetric
CEE. Then (38) implies
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It is straightforward to check that the equation 2 − 1 + = 0ε ε
− 2 − 1
1 −
ε1−
as a unique solution ε . If we deﬁne D p p( ) ≡ ε− , then
straightforward calculus shows that for D D= , the integral on the R.H.S. of (39) is equal to 0 for any pr . Therefore, if f is such that
for all p > 0, D p f D p( ) = ( ( )), then D p D p f D p′( ) = ′( ) ′( ( )) and
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Since x p D p( ) = ( /2)B r r , x p( )B r is strictly greater (smaller) than x p( )N m when p /2r is strictly smaller (greater) than pm. Since ?D ′ < 0
and f ′ > 0, the above equation shows that this is the case when f ′ is strictly increasing (decreasing), or equivalently, when D is more
convex than D .□
Proof of Proposition 10. Suppose β = 02 and let p
r be a CEE. Then the F.O.C. of the electoral best response of countries 1 (38)
implies that
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From (11), x p x p( ) > ( )B r N m1 1 2 if and only if < 1
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, and from the above equation,
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where the second equality uses D t t= − ′1(1/ )/G D tt
∂[ ( (1 / ))]
∂
31 1 . Since π π+ = 11 2 , the above equation can be rewritten as follows:
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The above equation shows that αp p
αp β p p( + )
r r
r r m
1 2
2 1 1 1
is smaller (greater) than 1, and thus x p( )B r1 is greater (smaller) than x p( )N m1 2 when
p p D p→ ′( )3 is increasing (increasing), or equivalently, when D is more convex than p1/ 2.
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As for country 2, the F.O.C. of its electoral best response of countries 2 can be obtained by substituting β = 01 in (38), inverting
the roles of 1 and 2, and replacing α by 1/a, which yields
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The above equation shows that p p>r m2 2 , which from (11), implies that x p x p( ) < ( )
B r N m
2 2 2 .□
A.8. Proofs in Section 7.1
Using the notations introduced in Section 7, since g x β x= +c c c c− − , we have that x =c
g β g
β β
−
1 −
c c c− −
1 2
, so the utility function of
representative pc
r in (13) can be rewritten as a function of the vector of public good levels g g( , )1 2 as follows: for all g ∈ +
2 ,
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Proof of Proposition 11. For a given x c− , the best response of representative pcr to x c− is the solution to the program
U p x xmax ( , , )x c c
r
c c≥0 −c . The F.O.C. of that convex program is x D p β x= max{0, ( ) − }c c c
r
c c− − . Since these best responses are continuous,
there exists an equilibrium, and any equilibrium x can be of one and only one of the following three types:
Type 1: D p β x( ) − > 0r1 1 2 2 and D p β x( ) − > 0
r
2 2 1 1 .
In that case,
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The two inequalities D p β x( ) − > 0r1 1 2 2 and D p β x( ) − > 0
r
2 2 1 1 are satisﬁed if and only if D p D p β β( )/ ( ) ∈ ( , 1/ )
r r
1 1 2 2 2 1 . The corresponding
level of public good is g x β x D p= + = ( )c c c c c c
r
− − .
Type 2: D p β x( ) − ≤ 0r1 1 2 2 and D p β x( ) − > 0
r
2 2 1 1 .
In that case, x = 01 and x D p= ( )r2 2 2 . The inequality D p β x( ) − > 0
r
2 2 1 1 is clearly satisﬁed, and D p β x( ) − ≤ 0
r
1 1 2 2 is satisﬁed when
D p D p β( )/ ( ) ≤r r1 1 2 2 2.
Type 3: D p β x( ) − > 0r1 1 2 2 and D p β x( ) − ≤ 0
r
2 2 1 1 .
In that case x D p= ( )r1 1 1 and x = 02 . The inequality D p β x( ) − > 0
r
1 1 2 2 is clearly satisﬁed, and D p β x( ) − ≤ 0
r
2 2 1 1 is satisﬁed when
D p D p( )/ ( ) ≥r r β1 1 2 2
1
1
.□
Proof of Proposition 12. For all pr such that D p D p β β( )/ ( ) ∈ ( , 1/ )r r1 1 2 2 2 1 , if pc
r is a noncooperative electoral best response to p c
r
− , it
must be a solution of U p x pmax ( , ( ))p c c
m N r
>0c
r , so it satisﬁes the F.O.C. U p x p p∂[ ( , ( ))]/∂ = 0m N r r1 1 1 . Using (14) and the fact that for all
p G D p p∈ ′ ( ( )) =c c++ , we obtain
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Substituting the above expression into the F.O.C. = 0U p x pp
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. From Proposition 11,
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.
As argued in Section 7.1, the outcome of the NEE is the outcome of the game in which the median voter of each country c controls
gc, taking g c− as given, and her payoﬀ is V p g( , )c c
m where Vc is deﬁned in (40). Because of the presence of positive externalities
captured by the term
β g
β β1 −
c c− −
1 2
in (40) it is obvious that the Nash equilibrium of that game is ineﬃcient, so there exists g* that is strictly
preferred by both median voters. From Lemma 1, g* is strictly preferred by a majority of voters in both countries as well. To conclude
the proof, it remains to show that any such vector g* must be such that
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these inequality is violated, say the latter for concreteness. Then
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so the median voter of country 1 does not strictly prefer g* to gNEE , a contradiction.
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A.9. Proofs in Section 7.2
In the policy making stage of the cooperative regime, the bargaining process maximizes B Δ p x( ( , )))r . To simplify the algebra, it
will be convenient to rescale the gains from cooperation Δ p x( , )c r by the multiplicative factor p1/ c
r, and to express it as a function of g
instead of x. That is, with a slight abuse of notations, we deﬁne
Δ p g
p
V p g V p g p( , ) ≡ 1 ( ( , ) − ( , ( ))).c r
c
r c c
r
c c
r N r
Since the generalized Nash bargaining solution that is, B Δ Δ Δ( ) = π π1 21 2 is invariant to linear transformation of the payoﬀs, this
rescaling is inconsequential.22 Using (40) and (14), we can write:
Δ p g
G g
p
g
β β
β g
β β
G D p
p
D p
β β
β D p
β β
( , ) =
( )
−
1 −
+
1 −
−
( ( ))
+
( )
1 −
−
( )
1 −
.c r
c c
c
r
c c c c c c
r
c
r
c c
r
c c c
r
1 2
− −
1 2 1 2
− − −
1 2 (41)
The program (6) can then be equivalently rewritten as a function of g as follows:
B Δ p gmax ( ( , )).
g β g
g β g
r
≥
≥
1 2 2
2 1 1 (42)
The following Lemma establishes inter alia Eq. (15).
Lemma 6. If we denote ?
⎛
⎝⎜
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎞
⎠⎟g f p D p D p( , ) ≡ ,
r β f
β β
r β f
β β
r
1
1 −
1 − 1 2
1 − /
1 − 2
1
1 2
2
1 2
, then the equation
?
?
f
B
Δ
Δ p g f p
B
Δ
Δ p g f p
=
∂
∂
( ( , ( , )))
∂
∂
( ( , ( , )))
r r
r r
2
1 (43)
has a unique solution f *, and ?g p g f p( ) = ( *, )B r r .
Proof. One can see from (41) that Δ p g( , )c r is strictly concave in g, so the same arguments as in Lemma 2 imply that the solution
g p( )B r to the program (42) is unique. To see why it must also be interior, suppose by contradiction that it is not. Then
g p β g p( ) = ( )c
B r
c c
B r
− − for some c, so x p( ) = 0c
B r and
U p x p G x p p x p G x p x G D p p D p U p x p( , ( )) = ( ( )) − ( )≤ max ( ) − ≤ ( ( )) − ( )< ( , ( )).c c
r B r
c c
B r
c
r
c
B r
x c c c
r
c c c c
r
c
r
c c
r
c c
r N r
− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − −
c−
The above inequality contradicts property (9).
Since g p( )B r is an interior solution to (42), it must satisfy the F.O.C. B Δ p g g∂[ ( ( , ))]/∂ = 0r . Using (41), these conditions can be
rewritten as
⎧
⎨
⎪⎪
⎩
⎪⎪⎪
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
B
Δ
Δ p x
G g
p β β
B
Δ
Δ p x
β
β β
B
Δ
Δ p x
β
β β
B
Δ
Δ p x
G g
p β β
∂
∂
( ( , ))
′1( )
− 1
1 −
+ ∂
∂
( ( , ))
1 −
= 0
∂
∂
( ( , ))
1 −
+ ∂
∂
( ( , ))
′2( )
− 1
1 −
= 0
r
r
r
r r
r
1
1
1 1 2 2
1
1 2
1
2
1 2 2
2
2 1 2
The above system can be viewed as a linear system in G g G g( ′1( ), ′2( ))1 2 whose solution is
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟⎟⎟
Gc g β
B
Δ
Δ p g
B
Δ
Δ p g
p
β β
′ ( ) = 1 −
∂
∂
( ( , ))
∂
∂
( ( , )) 1 −
.c c
c
r
c
r
c
r
−
1 2
Applying the function Dc and using the notation Bc introduced in Section 4.2, we obtain
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟g p D
βB B
β β
p( ) =
1 − /
1 −
.c
B r
c
c c c
c
r−
1 2 (44)
The latter equation can be rewritten as ?g p g f p( ) = ( , )B r r , where f is a solution to (43).
Reciprocally, let f * be a solution to (43), and let ?g g f p* = ( *, )r . Then using successively the deﬁnition of ?g and (43), we obtain
22 With other bargaining functions B, the results might depend on the particular aﬃne transformation of utility functions one uses in (6) to compute x p( )B r .
However, for the aﬃne transformationU p x p( , )/c c
r
c
r used in (41), the reader can check that, as in the basic model, our proofs hold more generally for any function B Δ( )
that satisﬁes (9) and (10).
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⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟BΔ Δ p g
G g
p β β
B
Δ
Δ p g
β
β β
B
Δ
Δ p g
β f
β β β β
B
Δ
Δ p
g
β
β β
B
Δ
Δ p g
β f
β β
B
Δ
Δ p g
β
β β
∂
∂
( ( , *))
′1( *)
− 1
1 −
+ ∂
∂
( ( , *))
1 −
= ∂
∂
( ( , *))
1 − *
1 −
− 1
1 −
+ ∂
∂
( ( ,
*))
1 −
= − ∂
∂
( ( , *))
*
1 −
+ ∂
∂
( ( , *))
1 −
= 0,
r
r
r r r
r r
1
1
1 1 2 2
1
1 2 1
1
1 2 1 2 2
1
1 2 1
1
1 2 2
1
1 2
which shows that g* satisﬁes the F.O.C. of the program (42) for c=1, as derived at the beginning of this proof. An analogous
reasoning shows that it also satisﬁes this F.O.C. for c=2. Therefore, g* is a solution to (42), so g g p* = ( )B r .
Thus, we have shown that the solutions to (43) are in a one to one relationship with the solutions of the program (42). Since the
latter program has a unique solution, (43) has a unique solution too.□
Lemma 7. For all pr , g p g p( ) ≥ ( )c
B r
c
N r .
Proof. We ﬁrst show that x p x p( ) ≥ ( )cB r cN r . Suppose this is not the case, then
U p x U p x x U p x x U p x( , ) < ( , , ) ≤ max ( , , ) = ( , ),c c
r B
c c
r
c
N
c
B
x c c
r
c
N
c c c
r N
− − − − − ≥0 − − − − −c−
which violates property (9). Since both countries make greater contributions, the level of public goods in both countries must be
higher, as needed.
The next lemma is the equivalent of Lemma 4 in the basic model. It shows that in the cooperative regime, the level of public good
gc
B in each country is strictly decreasing in the type of its representative pc
r, and thus that by choosing pc
r , the voters of each country
eﬀectively choose their level of public good (although pc
r also aﬀects the level of public good in the other country g c
B
− , see Lemma 9
below).
Lemma 8. For all pr such that
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟β∈ ,
D p
D p β
( )
( ) 2
1r
r
1 1
2 2 1
, < 0gp
∂ c
B
c
r .
Proof. The proof of this lemma follows the same logic as the proof of Lemma 4. Suppose by contradiction that there exists ?p r such
that ?p( ) ≥ 0gp
r∂ c
B
c
r . From (44),
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
g
p
βB B
β β
βp
β β
B B
p
D c
βB B
β β
p
∂
∂
=
1 − /
1 −
−
1 −
∂[ / ]
∂
′ 1 − /
1 −
.c
B
c
r
c c c c c
r
c c
c
r
c c c
c
r−
1 2 1 2
− −
1 2
By assumption, D c′ < 0 and ?p( ) ≥ 0gp
r∂ c
B
c
r . Substituting these two inequalities into the above equation, we obtain
?B B
p
p∂[ / ]
∂
( ) > 0.c c
c
r
r−
(45)
Together with (15), (45) implies that ?p( ) < 0gp
r∂
∂
c
B
c
r
− . Using (40), (15) and D G= ( ′ )c c
−1, simple calculus yields
? ? ? ? ?
?
V p g p p
p
βB B p
β β
g
p
p
β β
g
p
β p
β β
g
p
β B B p
β β
g
p
p p
β β
g
p
β p
β β
g
p
∂[ ( , ( , ))]
∂
=
(1 − / )
1 −
∂
∂
−
1 −
∂
∂
+
1 −
∂
∂
= −
( / )
1 −
∂
∂
−
( − )
1 −
∂
∂
+
1 −
∂
∂
,
c c
r B
c
r
c
r
c
r
c c c c
r
c
B
c
r
c
r
c
B
c
r
c c
r
c
B
c
r
c c c c
r
c
B
c
r
c
r
c
r
c
B
c
r
c c
r
c
B
c
r
− −
1 2 1 2
−
1 2
− −
1 2 1 2
−
1 2
−
where the functions in the above expressions are evaluated at ?p p( , )cr cr− . If we set ?p p=cr cr and substitute ?p( ) ≥ 0
g
p
r∂ c
B
c
r and ?p( ) < 0gp
r∂
∂
c
B
c
r
−
in the above expression, we obtain that ?? ? p( ) < 0V p g p pp c
r∂[ ( , ( , ))]
∂
c c
r B
c
r
c
r
c
r
− . Since ?g p( )B r is Pareto optimal for the representatives ?p r , the above
inequality implies that ?? ? p( ) ≥ 0U p g p pp c
r∂[ ( , ( , ))]
∂
c c
r B
c
r
c
r
c
r
− − − . Using (14), we always have ?? ? p( ) < 0V p g p pp
r∂[ ( , ( , ))]
∂
c c
r N
c
r
c
r
c
r
− − − . The last two inequalities
imply that the gain from cooperation for representative ?p cr− increases as pcr increases around ?pcr . Using the notation Δ p g( , )r , this
means that
?Δ p g p
p
p∂[ ( , ( ))]
∂
( ) > 0.c
r B r
c
r
r−
(46)
Diﬀerentiating (41) and using D G= ( ′ )c c
−1, we obtain
Δ p x p
p
βB B p
β β
g
p
G g
p
g
p
β
g
p
β β
p
g
p
G g
p
g
p
β β
βB B
β β
g
p
β
β β
g
p
β β
β β
g
p
G g G g
p
∂[ ( , ( ))]
∂
=
(1 − / )( )
1 −
∂
∂
− ( )
( )
−
∂
∂
−
∂
∂
1 −
−
( )
∂
∂
− ( )
( )
+
∂
∂
1 −
= −
/
1 −
∂
∂
+
1 −
∂
∂
+
1 −
∂
∂
− ( ) − ( )
( )
.
c
r B r
c
r
c c c c
r
c
B
c
r
B
c
r
c
B
c
r c
c
B
c
r c
r c
N
c
r
N
c
r
c
N
c
r
c c c c
B
c
r
c c
B
c
r
c
N
c
r
B N
c
r
−
2
1 2
2
−
−
1 2
2
2
1 2
−
1 2
−
1 2
− 1 2
1 2
2
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Substituting the inequalities ?p( ) ≥ 0gp
r∂
∂
c
B
c
r , ?p( ) < 0gp
r∂
∂
c
B
c
r
− , p D p( ) = ′ ( ) < 0,
g
p c
r
c c
r∂
∂
c
N
c
r and G g p G g p( ( )) ≥ ( ( ))B r N r (the latter inequality follows
from Lemma 7) into the above equation, we obtain that ?p( ) < 0Δ p x pp
r∂[ ( , ( ))]
∂
c
r B r
c
r . Using property (10), the latter inequality and (46) imply
then that B B/c c− must be strictly increasing in pcr at ?p p=r r , a contradiction with (45).□
Proof of Proposition 13. From (40), for any pr such that
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟β∈ ,
D p
D p β
( )
( ) 1
1r
r
1
2 2
, the welfare of the median voter in the cooperative policy
equilibrium is
V p g p G g p p
g p β g p
β β
( , ( )) = ( ( )) −
( ) − ( )
1 −
.c c
m B r
c c
B r
c
m c
B r
c c
B r
− −
1 2
Diﬀerentiating w.r.t. pc
r , and using (15) and D G= ( ′ )c c
−1, we obtain
V p g p
p
βB B p
β β
g
p
p
β β
g
p
p β
β β
g
p
∂[ ( , ( ))]
∂
=
(1 − / )
1 −
∂
∂
−
1 −
∂
∂
+
1 −
∂
∂
.c c
m B r
c
r
c c c c
r
c
B
c
r
c
m
c
B
c
r
c
m
c c
B
c
r
−
1 2 1 2
−
1 2
−
Suppose that pr is such that D p D p β β( )/ ( ) ∈ ( , 1/ )r r1 2 1 2 and pc
r is a cooperative electoral best response to p c
r
− . Then pc
rmust satisfy the
F.O.C. V p g p p∂[ ( , ( ))]/∂ = 0m B r r1 1 1 . Substituting the above equation into the F.O.C. and using the fact that from Lemma 8, g p∂ /∂ ≠ 0c
B
c
r ,
we obtain
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟βB B p p β
g
p
g
p
(1 − / ) = 1 −
∂
∂
/
∂
∂
.c c c c
r
c
m
c
c
B
c
r
c
B
c
r− −
−
Substituting the above equation into (15), we obtain
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟g p D
p
β β
β
g
p
g
p
( ) =
1 −
1 −
∂
∂
/
∂
∂
.c
B r
c
c
m
c
c
B
c
r
c
B
c
r
1 2
−
−
From Proposition 12, if p∼c
r is a noncooperative electoral best response of country c to some p∼ c
r
− , then
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟g p D( ) =
∼
c
N r
c
p
β β1 −
c
m
1 2
. By
comparing the latter two equations, we see that g p g p( ) − ( )∼c
B r
c
N r has the same sign as /gp
g
p
∂
∂
∂
∂
c
B
c
r
c
B
c
r
− , which from Lemma 8 has the opposite
sign of g p∂ /∂c
B
c
r
− , which from (15) has the opposite sign of B B p∂[ / ]/∂c c c
r
− . Thus, g p g p( ) − ( )∼c
B r
c
N r has the same sign as B B p∂[ / ]/∂c c c
r
− , as
needed.□
A.10. Proofs in Section 7.3
The next lemma is the equivalent of Lemma 5 in the basic model: it shows that the curvature of Dc determines how the type of a
representative pc
r aﬀects B B/c c− .
Lemma 9. Let φc be such that for all p > 0c
r , D p φ p( ) = (ln(1/ ))c c
r
c c
r . If φc is convex (concave), then for all p
r such that
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟β∈ ,
D p
D p β
( )
( ) 2
1r
r
1 1
2 2 1
, > 0 ( < 0)B Bp
∂[ / ]
∂
c c
c
r
− , where B c− and Bc are deﬁned in (8).
Proof. This proof follows the same steps as the proof of Lemma 5. We prove it for c=1, the proof for c=2 is analogous. From Lemma
6, B B/2 1 is given by the solution f to the ﬁxed point condition (43) for c=1. Therefore, it suﬃces to show that if φ1 is convex (concave),
then f p∂ /∂ > 0 ( < 0)r1 .
Diﬀerentiating (43) w.r.t. p r1 , and following the same algebraic steps as in Lemma 5, we obtain that f p∂ /∂
r
1 is given by (25), where?x is replaced by ?g (see Lemma 6) and Δ is given by (41). Since D′ < 0c , by deﬁnition of ?g (see Lemma 6), we have ?g f∂ /∂ > 01 and
?g f∂ /∂ < 02 . Moreover, from (41), ?p g( , ) = − = − < 0
Δ
g
r G g
p β β
β f
β β
∂
∂ 1 1
′1( ) 1
1 − 1 −r
1
1
1
1 1 2
1
1 2
, and ?p g( , ) = > 0Δg
r β
β β
∂
∂ 1 1 1 −
1
2
2
1 2
. Therefore, the term
? ?+Δg
g
f
Δ
g
g
f
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
1
1
1 1
2
2 in the denominator on the R.H.S. of (25) is negative. An analogous reasoning implies that
? ?+Δg
g
f
Δ
g
g
f
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
2
1
1 2
2
2 is positive.
Thus,
? ?+Δg
g
f
Δ
g
g
f
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
1
1
1 1
2
2 and
? ?+Δg
g
f
Δ
g
g
f
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
1
1
1 1
2
2 have the same sign as in Lemma 5, so the same reasoning implies that f
p
∂
∂ r1
is positive
(negative) when
?+Δp
Δ
g
g
p
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂r r
1
1
1
1
1
1
and
?⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟− +
Δ
p
Δ
g
g
p
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂r r
2
1
2
1
1
1
are both positive (negative). Therefore, to complete the proof, it suﬃces to show
that this is the case when φ1 is strictly convex (concave).
By deﬁnition of φ1, for all p > 01 , p D p φ p′ ( ) = − ′
(ln(1/ ))1 1 1 1 1 . Using the latter equation, (41) and the deﬁnition of ?g1 in Lemma 6, we
obtain
?⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
⎡
⎣
⎢⎢
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
⎤
⎦
⎥⎥
Δ
p
Δ
g
g
p
β D p
β β
β f β
β β
D
β f p
β β
β
β β p
φ
β β
β f p
φ
p
− ∂
∂
+ ∂
∂
∂
∂
=
′1( )
1 −
−
(1 − )
(1 − )
′1
(1 − )
1 −
=
(1 − )
′1 ln
1 −
(1 − )
− ′1 ln 1 ,r r
r r
r r r
2
1
2
1
1
1
1 1
1 2
1 1
1 2
2
1 1
1 2
1
1 2 1
1 2
1 1 1 (47)
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? ⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
⎡
⎣
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎛
⎝⎜
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎞
⎠⎟
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
⎛
⎝⎜
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎞
⎠⎟
⎛
⎝⎜
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎞
⎠⎟
⎤
⎦
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥
Δ
p
Δ
g
g
p
G g
p
G D p
p
D p
D p
β β
G c g
p β β
β f
β β
D
β f p
β β
β
β β p
G D p G D
β φ fφ
∂
∂
+ ∂
∂
∂
∂
= −
( )
( )
+
( ( ))
( )
− ′1( ) +
′1( )
1 −
+
′ ( )
− 1
1 −
1 −
1 −
′1
(1 − )
1 −
=
(1 − )
( ( )) −
− ′1 ln + ′1 ln
r r r
r
r
r
r
c
c
r
r
r
β β
β p
r β f p
β β
p
β β
β f p
1
1
1
1
1
1
1 1
1
2
1 1 1
1
2 1
1
1 2 1 2
1
1 2
1 1
1 2
1
1 2 1
1 −
1 1 1 1 1
(1 − )
1 −
2
1 1 −
(1 − )
r
r
r r
1 2
1 1
1 1
1 2
1
1 2
1 1
Simple calculus yields pD p φ p= ′1( ) = − ′1(ln(1/ ))G D pp
∂[ ( ( ))]
∂
1 1 , so the intermediate value theorem implies that there exists
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟p p∈ ,
β f p
β β
r(1 − )
1 − 1
r
1 1
1 2
such that
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
⎛
⎝⎜
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎞
⎠⎟
⎛
⎝⎜
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎞
⎠⎟G D p G D
β f p
β β
p
β f p
β β
φ
p
β p β f
β β
φ
p
( ( )) −
(1 − )
1 −
= − −
(1 − )
1 −
′1 ln 1 =
( − )
1 −
′1 ln 1 .r
r
r
r r
1 1 1 1
1 1
1 2
1
1 1
1 2
1 1 2
1 2
Substituting the above expression into the above expression for
?+Δp
Δ
g
g
p
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂r r
1
1
1
1
1
1
, we obtain
?
⎪ ⎪
⎪ ⎪
⎡
⎣
⎢⎢
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎛
⎝⎜
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎞
⎠⎟
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
⎧
⎨
⎩
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
⎛
⎝⎜
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎞
⎠⎟
⎫
⎬
⎭
⎤
⎦
⎥⎥
Δ
p
Δ
g
g
p
β
β β p
β φ
p
φ
p
f φ
β β
β f p
φ
p
∂
∂
+ ∂
∂
∂
∂
=
(1 − )
×
′
ln 1 −
′
ln 1 +
′
ln
1 −
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From Lemma 7,
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟D D p> ( )
β f p
β β
r
1
(1 − )
1 − 1 1
r
1 1
1 2
, so p p< <β f pβ β
r(1 − )
1 − 1
r
1 1
1 2
, and
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ln < ln < lnp p
β β
β f p
1 1 1 −
(1 − )r r1
1 2
1 1
. Therefore, (47) and (48) are both
positive (negative) when φ′1 is positive (negative), as needed.□The proof of Proposition 14 follows immediately from the following proposition, and from Deﬁnitions 2 and 3.
Proposition 17. Let pr and p∼r be two proﬁles of representatives such that D p D p β β( )/ ( ) ∈ ( , 1/ )r r1 1 2 2 2 1 , D p D p β β( )/ ( ) ∈ ( , 1/ )∼ ∼
r r
1 1 2 2 2 1 , pc
r
is a cooperative electoral best response to p c
r
− , and p∼c
r is a noncooperative electoral best response to p∼ c
r
− . If D p( )c is more (less)
convex than pln(1/ ), then g p( )c
B r is greater (smaller) than g p( )∼c
N r .
Proof. From Proposition 13, x p( )cB r is greater (smaller) than x p( )∼cN r if B B p∂[ / ]/∂c c c
r
− is positive (negative). Lemma 9 imply that this is
the case when D p( )c is more (less) convex than pln (1/ ), as needed.□
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